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ORWELL’S VISION: VIDEO AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
HOWARD M. WASSERMAN*
It is now evident that Orwell’s vision was wrong.  Modern technol-
ogy has turned out to be the totalitarian state’s worst enemy . . . . [I]t
is the people who are watching the government, not the other way
around.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Ric Simmons is half right on this point.  “Video cameras are in-
deed everywhere, but they are embedded into cell phones and
wielded by millions of individual citizens.”2  New portable technol-
ogy—digital cameras, camera-ready cell phones, MP3 recorders, and
other technology—enables people to produce their own personal
records of their lives and environment, including their confrontations
with police and encounters between government officials and other
members of the public.3  And an ever-expanding bevy of internet
sites—particularly YouTube, blogs, video blog (“vlogs”), and social-
networking sites—enable them to disseminate those recordings di-
rectly to the world and to see and respond to what others have
recorded.4
Law enforcement has responded by equipping itself with record-
ing technology.  Agencies use video to provide a record of encounters
between officers and members of the public—interrogations and con-
Copyright  2009 by Howard M. Wasserman.
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. Early
versions of this paper were presented at the 2007 Central States Law Schools Association
Annual Meeting and at a faculty workshop at Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on
Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 532 (2007).
2. Id.
3. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 164 (2007); TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 294 (2009); Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the
Lessons of History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the
Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 638–39 (2004); Jessica M.
Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, REL., GENDER & CLASS 17, 22 (2008) [here-
inafter Silbey, Cross-Examining]; Simmons, supra note 1, at 532–33. R
4. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 164; ZICK, supra note 3, at 257; Simmons, supra note 1, at R
532–33 & n.5.
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fessions,5 traffic stops,6 and high-speed chases7—with the multiple
goals of deterring police misconduct and creating an objective eviden-
tiary record of real-world events to establish whether a violation oc-
curred.8  Police also use their own hand-held surveillance cameras to
observe and preserve an evidentiary record of public activities, includ-
ing political protests.9
The result is a balance of power in which all sides can record
most police-public encounters occurring on the street and in the sta-
tionhouse.  Big Brother is watching the people, but the people are
watching him.  The effect of this balanced proliferation of technology
is to place video recording10 at the heart of modern civil rights litiga-
tion and the enforcement of constitutional liberties in controversies
arising from police-public encounters.  There is a self-reinforcing ex-
pansion in the amount of recording by all sides, the amount of public
dissemination of those recordings, the amount of constitutional litiga-
5. Drizin & Reich, supra note 3, at 641; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Conse- R
quences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psycho-
logical Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 494 & n.542 (1998); Jessica M.
Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House and the Genre of Documentary Film, 29 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 107, 116 & app. (2005) [hereinafter Silbey, Filmmaking]; Simmons, supra note 1, at R
566–67; The Justice Project, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: A Policy
Review 2 [hereinafter Justice Project], available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/polpack_recording-fin2.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
6. Simmons, supra note 1, at 566 (“In fact, as video technology gets cheaper and R
smaller, it will soon become feasible to record everything a police officer driving a squad
car sees and hears—as well as everything that police officer does during the traffic stop.”);
see also MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2003, at 28 (2006) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/lpd03.pdf; TARA ROSE &
GARY CORDNER, JUSTICE & SAFETY CTR., SMART BRIEFS, SURVEY NO. 6—IN-CAR CAMERAS 1
(2006), http://www.justnet.org/Lists/JUSTNET%20Resources/Attachments/594/SMART
_Brief_6.pdf [hereinafter SMART BRIEFS].
7. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1775–76 (2007); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman,
& Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cogni-
tive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 845–47 (2009); Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, R
at 17.
8. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5, at 494–95; Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 116, R
123–24; Simmons, supra note 1, at 566–67; Drizin & Reich, supra note 3, at 624. R
9. ZICK, supra note 3, at 318; see Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. R
2203(CSH), 2007 WL 1711775, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007) (describing police video
recording of protest rally by homeless advocacy group outside mayoral residence).
10. Video recording is complemented by the similarly widespread availability of audio
recording devices. Both enable real-time recording of public events that can be used as
evidence in litigation.  Everything that can be said, good and bad, about video recording of
public events and about video evidence is largely true of audio-recording evidence as well.
But see Stewart v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 15490(RMB)(FM), 2008 WL 1699797, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. April 9, 2008) (“[T]he issue is not what Stewart said, but what he intended. Un-
like the speed of a car, the meaning behind Stewart’s statements is not capable of being
captured on a videotape or audiotape.”).
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tion that centers on video and audio recording evidence, and the de-
gree to which enforcement of civil rights centers on video and audio
recording.
This balance triggers two questions, one at the back end and one
at the front end of any constitutional controversy.  At the front end is
the question of whether individuals can record police-public en-
counters as they occur and whether government can limit people’s
ability to use modern technology to create their own records of
events.  At the back end is the question of what role those recordings
play in enforcing constitutional rights and remedying constitutional
violations, especially in civil rights litigation.
Consider a number of examples of video’s back-end role in which
individual encounters between police and members of the public have
been captured on video and the video has been used in subsequent
constitutional claims to determine what happened in the real-world
events that occurred and the legality of the recorded conduct:
 In March 2001, Victor Harris led Georgia County sheriffs on a
six-minute, ten-mile nighttime chase at speeds up to eighty-
five miles per hour, proceeding largely along two-lane county
roads and in and around a mall parking lot.  At times the cars
crossed the center line and wove around other cars.  The
chase ended when the pursuing officer, Deputy Timothy
Scott, bumped the rear of Harris’s car, causing the car to
leave the roadway and crash down an embankment; the crash
left Harris a quadriplegic.  The entire chase was captured by a
dash-mounted video camera in Deputy Scott’s pursuing vehi-
cle that began recording when Scott switched on his siren.11
 In December 2005, Erik Crespo, a New York teen, allegedly
shot a man in the face.  Prior to charges being filed, a New
York City detective interrogated Crespo at the police station
about the shooting (which Crespo insisted had been in self-
defense) and about the whereabouts of the gun used.  The
detective tried to get Crespo to provide a written statement so
the detective would not be accused of lying at trial.  Crespo
did not give a written statement.  Testifying at trial, the detec-
tive denied this interrogation had taken place.  Unbeknownst
to the detective, however, Crespo had recorded the hour-and-
11. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772–73, 1775.  The Scott Court decided to “allow the videotape
to speak for itself,” posting it on the Court’s website and including the link in the opinion.
See id. at 1775 n.5; see also Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2007)
(describing video recording of similar high-speed car chase incident which resulted in the
fleeing suspect’s death).
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fifteen minute interrogation on an MP3 recorder in his
pocket.  The recording was turned over to prosecutors and
used as the basis for twelve counts of perjury against the
detective.12
 In September 2007, an officer from the St. George, Missouri,
Police Department confronted Brett Darrow while he sat in
his car in a deserted commuter parking lot around 2 a.m.
Darrow had a video camera mounted in the back of his car
(installed, he claimed, following prior traffic confrontations
with area police) that captured a profane tirade by the officer.
The officer repeatedly threatened to arrest Darrow on any
number of charges the officer could make up and to “ruin
[his] fucking night.”  Darrow posted the video on the internet
and the encounter quickly became a local and national story.
The officer was fired shortly after the incident, a decision
made on the strength of the video.  In March 2008, Darrow
filed a Section 1983 action against St. George and several
officers.13
 In November 2007, squad car video of a traffic stop in Utah
showed a state patrolman tasering an unarmed driver and
shouting at the driver’s pregnant wife when she attempted to
intervene.  Numerous copies of the video were uploaded to
YouTube and viewed more than two million times.  Review of
the video convinced prosecutors that the driver had done
nothing to warrant an arrest and the state settled the driver’s
action for $40,000.  But officials also concluded that the video
did not show any misconduct by the officer warranting depart-
mental punishment.14
12. Jim Dwyer, A Switch Is Flipped, and Justice Listens In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007, at B1;
Sean Gardiner, Transcripts: Bronx Teen Catches NYPD Lies on MP3-Player, THE VILLAGE VOICE,
Dec. 11, 2007, available at http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives/2007/12/
transcripts_bro.php.
13. Teresa Woodard, St. George Police Officer Fired, KTVI-myFOXstl.com, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://www.myfoxstl.com/myfox/pages/News/Detail?contentId=4425068&version=1&lo-
cale=EN-US&layoutCode=TSTY&pageId=3.2.1.  The video is available at http://www.live
video.com/video/PoliceBrutality/E50F08E74AD54B53AAF5C05137DF22E4/missouri-po-
lice-threaten-det.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).  Darrow’s stunt apparently angered local
law enforcement officers; he reported them staking out his house days later. See Posting to
Government Dirt, Cops Gone Wild – St. George County Missouri Cop – Caught on Video, http://
governmentdirt.com/cops_gone_wild_st_george_county_missouri_cop_caught_von_video
(last visited Mar. 30, 2009).  Darrow’s § 1983 complaint can be found at http://www.ac-
luem.org/downloads/ComplaintFileStamped.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
14. Mike Nizza, $40,000 for Man Tasered on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE, Mar. 11,
2008, available at http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/40000-for-man-tasered-
on-youtube/index.html?hp. The video viewed over two million times on YouTube is availa-
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 In May 2008, more than twelve Philadelphia police officers
were caught on video pulling three men from a car during a
traffic stop and beating and kicking them.  The actions were
filmed by an overhead news helicopter and the encounter im-
mediately became a national news story.  Police officials used
the videotape to identify the officers and most were removed
from street duty almost immediately.  The Philadelphia Police
Commissioner stated that, based on a surface view of the
video, it looked like the amount of force used was excessive,
but that it was important not to rush to judgment.15  Four of-
ficers were fired and four others disciplined less than one
month after the incident.16
The influence of video evidence extends beyond cases of individ-
ual police-citizen encounters to large-scale encounters—usually public
parades, protests, rallies, and other expressive public gatherings—that
have devolved into confrontation, chaos, and often violence between
police and protesters.17  Again, consider several illustrative examples:
 “Battle in Seattle”: The 1999 World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
conference in Seattle.  Tens of thousands of protesters de-
scended upon Seattle in the days leading up to the WTO
meeting, engaging in parades, marches, and protest rallies,
both permitted and within designated areas, as well as in viola-
tion of permissible regulations.  While much protest activity
was peaceful, a number of people engaged in violence against
property in the downtown area and against police officers pre-
sent to help keep the peace.  Police responded not with ex-
pected “passive resistance” or large-scale arrests, but instead
with non-lethal weapons (tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber
bullets) to disperse even peaceful crowds.  The mayor then
declared a civil emergency and imposed a general curfew and
a limited curfew in the core area downtown where the con-
vention was taking place and convention delegates were stay-
ble at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMaMYL_shxc&eurl=http://www.volokh.com/
posts/chain_1197068663.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).  For a discussion of the ambigu-
ity of the video, see Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
archives/archive_2007_12_09-2007_12_15.shtml#1197327587 (Dec. 10, 2007, 21:40 EST).
15. Jon Hurdle, Police Beating of Suspects Is Taped by TV Station in Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2008, at A29; Patrick Walters, Philly Police Beating Caught on TV Video, ABCNEWS, May
7, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/wireStory?id=4801701. This video is
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OzFEY8u1rRw (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
16. Jon Hurdle, Four Philadelphia Police Fired Over Filmed Beating, REUTERS, May 19, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN1956317820080519.
17. See ZICK, supra note 3, at 221–26. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR303.txt unknown Seq: 6 21-APR-09 11:02
2009] VIDEO AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 605
ing.  Police enforced the last element by prohibiting “any
demonstrations within that core area” for the rest of the con-
ference,18 which one commentator described as “effectively
making it illegal for a time to express ‘anti-WTO’ opinions in
a large section of downtown Seattle.”19  There were more than
300 arrests of people who gathered in the restricted zone in
violation of the limited curfew.  Many encounters between
protesters and police were captured on video and video
played a significant evidentiary role in subsequent litigation.
The city prevailed on many (but not all) claims on summary
judgment and eventually settled a number of lawsuits by
peaceful protesters for $1 million.20
 Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”) 2003 meeting in Miami.
Other cities learned the lessons of Seattle, resulting in a siege
mentality of sorts at public political events.21  One example of
this lesson in action took place in Miami in 2003.  The city
anticipated the FTAA meeting by enacting a series of mea-
sures restricting protest and public expression in downtown
Miami, all sunsetting at the end of the meeting.  Police rolled
out a massive presence—more than 2,500 officers patrolling
the streets of downtown, decked out in riot gear—that gener-
ally attempted to push protesters out of the downtown area,
using both non-lethal weapons to disperse crowds and execut-
ing approximately 230 arrests, almost all on charges that were
dropped.  Twenty-one protesters settled with the City of
Miami, Miami-Dade County, and several other jurisdictions
that provided police services, for more than $560,000.22
 May Day Immigration Rally in Los Angeles’s MacArthur Park.  In
May 2007, a series of marches and rallies were planned in sup-
port of changing immigration policies, all to culminate in a
final rally in MacArthur Park.  A crowd of 6,000 to 7,000 peo-
ple gathered at the entrance to the park in late afternoon.
18. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1120–25 (9th Cir. 2005).
19. ZICK, supra note 3, at 223. R
20. Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1126–27; ZICK, supra note 3, at 223. R
21. See ZICK, supra note 3, at 226, 249 (arguing that the militarization of public places at R
critical democratic moments has a chilling effect on public dissent).
22. Michael Vasquez, Miami OK’s Payout to FTAA Protesters, CommonDreams.org, Oct.
12, 2007, http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/10/12/4508/; see Tamara Lush,
FTAA Settlement Reached, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, available at http://www.miaminew-
times.com/2007-10-04/news/ftaa-settlement-reached.  This video is available at http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=e9g7FNcJ39U (last visited Mar. 13, 2009), and http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=6qTJwEz7U3A&feature=related (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
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Police began pushing and compressing the crowd to keep it
together and move it into the park, causing tensions to rise
and the situation to devolve into confrontations between po-
lice and a small handful of protesters.  Ultimately, in an effort
captured on a number of videos, police on the scene, dressed
in riot gear, decided to disperse the crowd and clear the park
using batons and non-lethal munitions against protesters—
peaceful and otherwise—and members of the media.  In the
end, officers drove thousands of people from the park,
deployed more than 140 less-lethal munitions and more than
100 uses of batons, and caused injuries to 246 people.  A de-
partmental report on the incident relied heavily on multiple
videos of the events, created by both the news media and rally
participants.23
 July 2008 “Critical Mass” bike ride in New York City. In July 2008,
during the monthly “Critical Mass” protest bike ride in New
York City, a rookie uniformed officer picked out and tackled
one rider, who then was arrested and held on charges of at-
tempted assault and resisting arrest.  A bystander video-re-
corded the ride and the tackle, which seemed to show the
officer taking several steps from the middle of the road to-
ward the curb and using his shoulder to knock the rider
down.  The video was viewed almost 1.2 million times in its
first four days on YouTube, and was then picked up by news
blogs and many mainstream media publications.  In addition,
the officer filed an affidavit stating that the rider had aimed
the bicycle at the officer and ridden into him, knocking them
both down, a statement contradicted by the most common
public take on the video.  The officer initially was placed on
23. LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSION-
ERS: “AN EXAMINATION OF MAY DAY 2007,” at 7–9, 69 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter LAPD REPORT].  This video is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
gJvIqnw5_1s (last visited Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYVWAqSR
BUU&feature=related (last visited Mar. 13, 2009), and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ivn8PrZlAXo&feature=related (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
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modified assignment, pending investigation.24  He ultimately
was fired.25
Together, these examples demonstrate two ways in which video,
audio, and other new communications technology affect the framing
and understanding of interactions between the public and police and
the civil rights disputes arising from such interactions.  First, video evi-
dence alters the litigation and resolution of civil rights claims in con-
stitutional litigation under Section 1983 and its federal equivalent.26
Courts approach video cases with a strong belief that video is a singu-
larly powerful and unambiguous source of proof, one that holds great
sway with fact-finders and that may be difficult for a party to over-
come.27  Video is the “proverbial smoking gun,” providing evidentiary
certainty as to what happened in the real world.28  More fundamen-
tally, video is seen as a truthful, unbiased, objective, and unambiguous
reproduction of reality, deserving of controlling and dispositive
weight.29  In fact, it may be taken as so singular and powerful that it
obviates trials and fact-finders altogether.  Judges may become increas-
ingly willing to conclude, based on personal viewing and assessment,
that a video recording of a law-enforcement encounter is capable of
bearing only one reasonable meaning or message: No reasonable ju-
ror could see anything different on that video during trial, and con-
flicting non-video evidence can be discredited and ignored.30
Such was the case in Scott v. Harris,31 where the Supreme Court
held that the video of a high-speed chase justified summary judgment
in favor of the defendant police officer on an excessive-force claim
24. Sewell Chan, Police Investigate Officer in Critical Mass Video, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM,
July 28, 2008,  http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/police-investigate-officer-
in-critical-mass-video/index.html?hp; Affidavit of Police Officer Patrick Pogan, New York v.
Long [hereinafter  Pogan Affidavit], available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/
years/2008/0729081bike1.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2009); Posting of Frank Pasquale to
Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/07/saved_by_
pervas.html#more (July 28, 2008, 20:00 EST).  This video is available at http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=oUkiyBVytRQ (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).  The video was posted July
27, 2008, and as of July 31, 2008, 1.2 million people had viewed it.
25. Trymaine Lee, Police Officer Who Shoved a Bicyclist Is Off the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2009, at A24.
26. The federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action was established by Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
27. Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 17; Jessica M. Silbey, Judges As Film Critics: R
New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 508–09 (2004) [hereinafter
Silbey, Critics].
28. Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 550. R
29. Id. at 508–09; Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 18; Silbey, Filmmaking, supra R
note 5, at 111. R
30. See infra Part III.
31. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
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because all non-video evidence and all competing interpretations of
the video were “blatantly contradicted” by what the Court understood
as the video’s singular message.32  Several lower courts have wielded
this new power to decide summary judgment on “brute sense impres-
sions”33 of video, with varying results.34  The open question, post-Scott,
is how far courts will take this power and in what direction.35
Second, video triggers a range of non-litigation responses and res-
olutions by government lawyers and policymakers to the recorded en-
counter.  These may include settlement of litigation, as in many of the
protester cases;36 dismissal of criminal charges; administrative and
personnel actions against the officers involved (firing, suspending,
reassigning), as in the wake of the LAPD report;37 and changes to
departmental policies, training, and procedures.38  Video also enables
members of the public to frame the public perception of a police
encounter.39
But assumptions about the conclusiveness of video may be more
myth than reality.40  Jessica Silbey applies ideas of film and literary
theory to argue that film, “like any representational form, must be
interpreted, and its specific language and its way of constructing
meaning must be accounted for.”41  What a piece of video evidence
means or signifies depends on who is watching, perceiving, and inter-
preting.42  Supplementing that insight, Dan Kahan, David Hoffman,
and Donald Braman demonstrate that video evidence is uniquely ripe
for highly contextualized and individualized interpretations, likely af-
fected by a viewer’s identity-defining cultural characteristics of race,
32. Id. at 1775–76, 1779; Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 840. R
33. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 903. R
34. See, e.g., Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 236, 239 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on
video to reverse lower court’s denial of summary judgment); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d
1260, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (relying on video evidence to affirm the grant of summary
judgment); Marion v. City of Corydon, No. 4:07-cv-0003-DFH-WGH, 2008 WL 763211, at *1
& n.1 (S.D. Ind. March 20, 2008) (same). But see Green v. N.J. State Police, 246 F. App’x
158, 159 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the video evidence is “inconclusive on sev-
eral of the key disputed facts,” precluding summary judgment).
35. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 900 (“In the aftermath, too, of Scott, judges might R
well feel emboldened to give more decisive weight to the factual inferences they themselves
are inclined to draw from videos or photographs.”).
36. ZICK, supra note 3, at 223; see Nizza, supra note 14 (discussing settlement in Utah R
taser case); Vasquez, supra note 22 (discussing settlement in FTAA case). R
37. See LAPD REPORT, supra note 23, at 70. R
38. See id. at 70–77.
39. See ZICK, supra note 3, at 295. R
40. Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 18. R
41. Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 534. R
42. See id.
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age, sex, socio-economic status, education, cultural orientation, ideol-
ogy, and party affiliation.43  These complementary insights suggest
that video evidence should not blithely be accepted as an unambigu-
ous, singular, and objective, and thus entirely truthful, reproduction
of real-world events.
Armed with a clearer understanding of video and audio record-
ing and its evidentiary function, judges, jurors, policymakers, and
members of the public should better understand the appropriate role
of video.  A level of caution and a degree of humility are necessary
with respect to viewers’ beliefs about what they see, what they under-
stand from the recording, and what steps to take in response.44  As
Silbey argues, filmic evidence is important and beneficial and it pro-
motes justice, but it is not a cure-all, being merely “one version of . . .
events,” of which there are likely to be many.45  A healthy respect for
procedural details, for other actors in the process, and for diverse cul-
tural characteristics within society further counsels judicial caution, a
“mental double-check” before a court grants summary judgment in
the face of culturally based interpretative differences.46  It is a mistake
to overemphasize video’s evidentiary usefulness.  And it is a mistake to
depart from ordinary procedures, as by expanding the use of sum-
mary judgment, given the real, albeit not fully acknowledged, limits
on video as a type of proof.47
At the front end of civil rights disputes, the video-civil rights link
lies in determining who has the power, right, and ability to record
events in public and to create evidence of police-public encounters.
This question implicates distinct constitutional concerns. The increas-
ing number of people equipped with recording devices at all times
means that “everyday people can snap up images, becoming amateur
paparazzi.”48  Alternatively, and more positively, we might say that eve-
ryone can become a chronicler of life.49  This includes becoming a
chronicler of coercive and arguably unlawful confrontations between
law enforcement, the public, and the creator of the newly important
video evidence, to be used when those confrontations produce
litigation.
43. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 903. R
44. See infra Part II.A.
45. Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 114. R
46. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 898, 901. R
47. See infra Part III.E.
48. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 164. R
49. Id.
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The antecedent constitutional question is whether members of
the public have a positive liberty, grounded in the First Amendment,
to record public-police encounters in public spaces and to be the
source of video evidence of police misconduct, whether for the pur-
pose of litigation, public dissemination, or both.  For Simmons’s cen-
tral hypothesis—that people are using technology to watch, and thus
to check, government—to hold, the answer must be “yes,” so as to
maintain the balance of power in control of video evidence.  Big
Brother cannot stop the people from watching him.
Courts will answer this question by resolving constitutional chal-
lenges to police interference—either through express prohibitions on
recording or through enforcement of general rules of public con-
duct—with efforts by members of the public to record their own or
others’ public encounters with police.  The outcomes of these “secon-
dary” challenges to restrictions on public video and audio recording
at the front end of the dispute determine the real effect that recorded
evidence, including evidence from the “people who are watching the
government,”50 will have on “primary” litigation over the constitution-
ality of the initial police-public encounter at the back end.  Again,
some examples:
 In October 1998, Michael Hyde was pulled over while driving
with an excessively loud exhaust system and an unlit rear
light.  The stop quickly became confrontational, either be-
cause Hyde was loud, argumentative, and uncooperative, or
because everyone involved was bickering and using profanity.
Hyde’s passenger, Daniel Hartesty, was pat-searched and
items were pulled from the car and inspected.  Because the
stop “had gone so sour,” Hyde was allowed to leave with a
verbal warning.  Unbeknownst to the officers, however, Hyde
recorded the entire encounter with a hand-held tape re-
corder.  Several days later, Hyde filed a formal departmental
complaint against the officers involved in the stop and submit-
ted the audio tape as substantiating evidence.  The officers
were exonerated following an internal investigation.  Mean-
while, Hyde was charged and convicted on four counts of ille-
gal wiretapping under Massachusetts law, which prohibits all
secret or unauthorized recording of oral conversations and
allows for no exceptions for communications with law en-
forcement officers.51
50. Simmons, supra note 1, at 532. R
51. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964–65, 966 (Mass. 2001).
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 In October 2002, Allen Robinson videotaped state police of-
ficers conducting searches of trucks along a public highway
while he was standing twenty to thirty feet away on private
property, with the owner’s permission.  Robinson previously
had complained to a state legislator about the allegedly un-
safe manner in which state police conduct these searches and
the video was in further support of his petition activities.  His
efforts to record these inspections two years earlier resulted in
his arrest and conviction for harassment.  This time, police
ordered Robinson to stop filming, confiscated his camera,
threatened to erase the tape, arrested him, and cited him for
harassment, a charge that was ultimately dismissed at trial.52
Recording evidence is beneficial to civil rights enforcement and
to the ability of the public to call government to account for its of-
ficers’ misconduct.  Ultimately, video and audio recording does and
should play a role in civil rights litigation and policymaking as impor-
tant probative evidence to be used at the back end of litigating, deter-
mining, and remediating constitutional misconduct.  The details of
that role depend on rules that strike a proper evidentiary and proce-
dural balance between video’s benefits and its limitations.  Having rec-
ognized that recording evidence will play some (and an increasingly
prominent) role at the back end of police-public encounters, positive
legal rules and law enforcement actions cannot limit the availability of
recording evidence by restricting members of the public from using
the resources and technology at their disposal to obtain and dissemi-
nate video at the front end of those encounters.
II. CIVIL RIGHTS AND VIDEO
A. Civil Rights Litigation
The illustrative civil rights incidents described in the Introduc-
tion divide into three broad categories of claims in which video plays a
real-world or evidentiary role.53  Video and audio recording will be
central to all three categories of cases—at the front end for its role in
real-world events triggering police-public confrontation and at the
back end for evidentiary use of recordings in remedying the pur-
ported constitutional violation captured on film.
The first category involves straightforward Fourth and Fifth
Amendment claims based on primarily individual interactions be-
52. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538–40 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
53. For present purposes, I limit the focus to controversies of allegedly unconstitu-
tional conduct by law enforcement officials.
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tween police and members of the public, particularly criminal sus-
pects.  We can subdivide this category further: interactions occurring
indoors, namely custodial interrogations and confessions,54 and inter-
actions occurring in public, involving traffic stops, high-speed chases,
Terry stops, and other personal on-the-street encounters.55
The second category includes claims arising from political pa-
rades, rallies, protests, and other expressive public gatherings that de-
volve into conflict, confrontation, and occasionally violence.  This
category typically involves hybrid claims: There is a Fourth Amend-
ment component, with individuals claiming they were subject to
wrongful arrest or excessive force, and a First Amendment compo-
nent, with protesters claiming that officers acted in a way that
abridged their liberty to speak.56
The hybrid nature, as well as the larger number of people in-
volved in mass-protest claims, requires these cases to be grouped in a
distinct category.  The free-speech element places a different gloss on
events because the propriety of the arrest or use of force under the
Fourth Amendment takes into account whether the citizen was en-
gaged in protected expressive activity and the details of police re-
sponse to that activity.  The First Amendment claim often is more
difficult to prove, as courts require proof that the officer was moti-
vated to chill or deter protected speech because of opposition to the
speaker’s message.57  And the unique circumstances of a large,
crowded public protest create both increased opportunities for un-
constitutional interaction between police and the public, as well as
increased opportunities for recording evidence by multiple sources.
This category is a product of the evolution of public space and
the devaluation of public protest in those spaces.  Timothy Zick argues
54. See Drizin & Reich, supra note 3, at 641 (describing “growing movement among law R
enforcement agencies . . . to record interrogations”); Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5, at 494–95 R
(describing benefits of recording interrogations); Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 116 & R
app. A (reviewing state policies on recording interrogations and discussing the benefits of
recording interrogations); Simmons, supra note 1, at 566 (same); see also Justice Project, R
supra note 5, at 2 (same). R
55. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 566 (“In fact, as video technology gets cheaper and R
smaller, it will soon become feasible to record everything a police officer driving a squad
car sees and hears—as well as everything that police officer does during the traffic stop.”);
see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 28 (providing statistics on uses of R
video cameras by local police departments); SMART BRIEFS, supra note 6, at 1 (providing R
statistics on the use of in-car cameras).
56. See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving
First and Fourth Amendment claims arising from the arrest of a protester at the WTO
conference).
57. Id. at 1155.
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that public expression and public contention have been “institutional-
ized,” whereby most public protest has been managed into a routin-
ized and neutered state.58  Protests occur under a regime of
“negotiated management” between protesters and government, where
protester and protest target agree to minute details as to the timing,
routes, locations, participation, and all aspects of large-scale expres-
sive events.59  As a result, public expression is less spontaneous, more
organized, more professional, and more controlled in terms of how,
when, and where protesters can go.60  But the result is that protest
speech carries less of a sting.61
Complementing this development is what Zick calls the “militari-
zation” of public spaces,62 which increases the likelihood of police-
protester confrontations and clashes.  Protest crowds likely will be
larger because, given the requirement of permits and elaborately ne-
gotiated details,63 there will be fewer rallies and marches, and the sin-
gle professional, organized rally may constitute the lone opportunity
for members of the public to speak and be heard on the streets.  Rec-
ognizing the likelihood of larger crowds, police respond with a mas-
sive presence and a willingness (if not explicit policy) to use quickly
escalating force to disperse crowds (even peaceful ones), and to effect
large-scale mass arrests whenever protests move, in numbers or ac-
tions, beyond what had been negotiated or expected.64  In Seattle, po-
lice were caught off-guard and were too willing to jump quickly to the
use of force and crowd dispersal.65  The lesson for other cities was to
similarly move directly to the use of force, crowd dispersal, and mass
arrests at the first sign of large crowds.66  Under such conditions, con-
frontation between police and protesters becomes almost inevitable
because, when officials “gird for battle” and commit to maintaining a
58. ZICK, supra note 3, at 196. R
59. Id. at 197, 198.
60. Id. at 198–99.
61. See id. at 197 (“The overarching aim of ‘negotiated management’ . . . is to achieve
predictability and public order during public protests and other events.”); id. at 198 (argu-
ing that pre-event planning and advanced negotiation have routinized protest and re-
moved much of its sting).
62. Id. at 223.
63. See id. at 198, 240 (arguing that the negotiated management of public protests,
including permit schemes and time, place, and manner restrictions, have made public
demonstrations largely “institutionalized” displays).
64. See id. at 222 (describing the use of escalated force and violence by police when
Seattle protesters moved beyond designated protest zones).
65. Id.
66. LAPD REPORT, supra note 23, at 7–9. R
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certain kind of public order, the incidence of force or violence may
increase.67
The final category includes what I call secondary civil rights cases,
in which the constitutional challenge is to front-end efforts to prevent
members of the public from recording a law enforcement encounter,
whether their own or one involving other members of the public.68
The question here is to what extent government can prohibit surrepti-
tious or unconsented-to recording of police officers performing their
official functions in public.69  Or, absent a direct prohibition, to what
extent officers may halt or interfere with individuals’ efforts to record
officers performing public functions by ordering them to cease re-
cording, confiscating the camera or recorder, and, perhaps, arresting
them.  The answers to these questions move us into an uncharted and
under-theorized First Amendment realm.70
B. Finding Video
Video recordings for use as back-end evidence may come from
any or all of three sources.  The most common source, particularly in
individual police-public encounters, is law enforcement itself.  Several
states require electronic recording (audio or video) of all interroga-
tions and confessions and a number of other states have considered or
are considering similar legislation.71  In addition, many individual po-
lice departments and sheriff offices throughout the country have
adopted individualized recording policies.72  Commentators view re-
cording as the way to protect against unfounded claims of false and
coerced confessions, prevent and deter officer misconduct, and en-
sure department accountability for actual misconduct, all by providing
67. ZICK, supra note 3, at 255 (arguing that escalated force may “result in escalated R
disruption and public disorder as activists react to aggressive police tactics and militariza-
tion techniques”).
68. See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (arising from police
efforts to prevent individual from recording street protest); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (arising from individual recording Pennsylvania state
trooper actions from private property).
69. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964–65 (Mass. 2001) (prosecution
under state wiretap statute).
70. See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 254–56 &
n.26 (2004); see infra Part V.
71. Five states and the District of Columbia presently require electronic recording of
interrogation and/or confessions for all or certain crimes. See Silbey, Filmmaking, supra
note 5, at 175; Justice Project, supra note 5, at 2; cf. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 969 n.9 (citing R
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d 1326, 1327–29 (Mass. 1996)) (recognizing police-con-
trolled recording as “good practice”).
72. Justice Project, supra note 5, at 2. R
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objective proof of what happened in the interrogation room.73  There
has been a similar trend towards equipping police cars with video
cameras, again with the goal of accurately capturing the encounter
and deterring police violations.  According to recent reports, sixty per-
cent of local police departments and sixty-six percent of sheriffs’ of-
fices use video cameras in public, most commonly in patrol cars.74
Cost often is cited as the reason that car-mounted cameras are not
more widespread, suggesting a broader desire to make use of such
video evidence.75  We can expect the decision in Scott—where the of-
ficer’s defense to the excessive force claim was dispositively estab-
lished by the presence of video—to accelerate the use of car video.
Law enforcement also has begun using video for broader public sur-
veillance of political protests and rallies, relying on both mounted sta-
tionary cameras and hand-held equipment.76
The second source is the news media that cover public en-
counters.  Media coverage of public expression and government re-
sponse to public expression has a storied interaction with the
enforcement of civil rights.  Television coverage of peaceful protesters
attacked by police dogs and fire hoses in the civil rights-era South is
widely credited with rousing northern whites to support the cause of
civil rights, leading ultimately to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.77  Media
footage also frequently provides police, prosecutors, and the court
with important evidence.78  News agencies typically are willing to
73. Drizin & Reich, supra note 3, at 622; Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 121–24; R
Simmons, supra note 1, at 566; see also Justice Project, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that R
creating an electronic recording of an interrogation provides an objective record akin to
DNA evidence); SMART BRIEFS, supra note 6, at 2 (“In-car cameras provide an objective R
recording of interactions between law enforcement and citizens.”).
74. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 28; SMART BRIEFS, supra note 6, at 2. R
75. SMART BRIEFS, supra note 6, at 1. R
76. ZICK, supra note 3, at 294; see Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. R
2203(CSH), 2007 WL 1711775, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007) (describing police recording
of protest rally outside mayoral residence by homeless advocacy group). But see ZICK, supra
note 3, at 303 (arguing that government surveillance of peaceful expressive activities raises R
serious First Amendment concerns with respect to protest speech).
77. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 435 (2004); Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and
Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and its Aftermath, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1518–19 (2006); Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of
Education: Some Notes on Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 801 (2005).
78. In United States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1982), the defendant was
charged with assaulting a member of Congress after throwing eggs at Congressman John
Anderson, who at the time was a presidential candidate. Id. at 864.  The prosecution
presented media-shot video footage of eggs coming from the off-camera area in which
Guerrero had been standing, although it did not show who had thrown them. Id. at
864–65.  The jury convicted, in part on the strength of the video. Id. at 865.  Silbey holds
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share outtakes with law enforcement and, in any event, reporters’ un-
used materials typically are subject to subpoena.79
The import of the media as a source of video evidence ties to the
new institutionalization of public protest.  Protests are fewer and
larger, subject to greater restrictions, controls, and limitations in ad-
vance, and met with police seeking to maintain order, all of which
increase the likelihood of confrontation between police and protes-
ters.80  The potential for conflict makes political rallies more attractive
media events, resulting in more press coverage.81
The third, and increasingly common, source of video evidence is
the public itself, the key to Simmons’s counter-Orwellianism.
Equipped with small recording devices—phones with picture-taking
and video-recording capability, MP3 recorders, hand-held digital cam-
eras, microscopic tape recorders—individuals are able to record the
world around them.82  That world includes individual encounters with
police and political rallies in which the recorder is a participant.  This
is not necessarily a new phenomenon.  In Fordyce v. City of Seattle,83 the
plaintiff, a member of the parading group, had volunteered to video a
1990 march for “local television production”—presumably public-ac-
cess cable—when he scuffled with, and was arrested by, police at-
tempting to dissuade and prevent him from recording the events.84
Recording technology now is smaller, cheaper, easier to operate,
easier to hide, and more pervasive, expanding personal opportunities
to record events.85  That expansion combines with the development
out Guerrero as an example of court and jury tendency to overweigh video evidence.  Silbey,
Critics, supra note 27, at 515–16.  The video did not show who had thrown the eggs—only R
that they had come from a crowd of people in Guerrero’s direction—and there was no
strong witness testimony that it had been the defendant. Id. at 515.  But, Silbey argues, the
video made it easy for the court to decide the defendant’s guilt by providing “the last and
best word” as to what happened. Id. at 516.
79. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (upholding issuance of
warrant to search for evidence at premises of newspaper); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201
F. App’x 430, 431–32 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming contempt citation against person who
refused to appear before grand jury and provide copies of video footage of public protest).
But see First Amendment Center, Ore. Videographer Vows to Defy Subpoena for Footage
(July 13, 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=20291 (discussing in-
dependent videographer’s refusal to turn over footage of protest rally and stun-gun arrest
to grand jury).
80. ZICK, supra note 3, at 255; see supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text. R
81. ZICK, supra note 3, at 257. R
82. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 164; ZICK, supra note 3, at 294; Drizin & Reich, supra note R
3, at 638–39; Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 22; Simmons, supra note 1, at 532–33. R
83. 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).
84. Id. at 438.
85. ZICK, supra note 3, at 294; Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 22; Simmons, R
supra note 1, at 532. R
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of new means of disseminating audio and video recordings to a mass
audience.86  The most prominent of these is the website YouTube,87
which draws more than 100 million viewers each day and which
hosted an average of 65,000 new videos per day in 2006.88  Addition-
ally, a vast array of blogs, vlogs, social-networking sites (such as
Facebook), and other internet sites have developed as information
distribution sources.89  Many are dedicated to posting photos and
videos from ordinary people for wide public viewing and discussion,
all with the goal of getting new information to the world, whether of
broad public or narrow private interest.90  The person recording a po-
lice-public encounter need no longer be even a purported freelance
journalist seeking to capture and report events for mainstream news
sources.91  Every person is a potential reporter.
One might deride these developments as enabling everyone to
become “amateur paparazzi.”92  Or one might welcome them as em-
powering the public as a whole to document how government treats
its community and, where appropriate, to expose government miscon-
duct to the nation and to call government officials to account.93  It
also shows how far society has come in the acquisition and dissemina-
tion of recorded evidence.  The infamous case of Rodney King, in
which a bystander happened upon LAPD officers using apparently ex-
cessive force in arresting a driver and videotaped the incident for pub-
lic consumption,94 arguably was an outlier in 1991, dependent on the
then-rare fortuity of an individual having a video camera and on the
mainstream media running with the video and the story.  Technologi-
cal improvement means that recorded evidence of police-public en-
86. The expansion of who can record and disseminate information blurs the lines be-
tween recording by news media and recording by members of the public. Such blurring of
lines only matters if laws, such as reporter shield laws, attempt to draw distinctions between
journalists and others as to who must comply with orders to turn over potential video
evidence to the court. That is beyond the scope of this paper, although it might present an
interesting future avenue of discussion.
87. YouTube Home Page, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
88. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 164. R
89. Id. at 21–30, 164; Simmons, supra note 1, at 532–33. R
90. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 163–64. R
91. See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving affiliated
volunteer’s efforts to record police activity for local cable cast); Connell v. Town of Hud-
son, 733 F. Supp. 465, 466 (D.N.H. 1990) (involving freelance photographer’s efforts to
record accident scene).
92. SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 164. R
93. Id.; Simmons, supra note 1, at 532–33. R
94. Simmons, supra note 1, at 532–33 n.5; see also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d R
963, 971–72 & nn.1–2 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (discussing benefit of by-
stander videotape of the Rodney King beating).
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counters, good and bad, will be the norm, more frequent and more
widely disseminated, within and without the news media.95  Many of
the incidents discussed in the Introduction became national stories
after video appeared on non-mainstream internet sites.96
Zick argues that new technologies for recording and disseminat-
ing expression enable groups to overcome the ever-increasing limits
on public speech that trigger speech-based confrontations between
police and protest groups.  Expressive groups get their messages and
images out immediately, reaching a wide audience with their own nar-
rative about the encounter with police, unfiltered and unaltered by
mainstream media or the police.97  Videos purporting to show abridg-
ments of a group’s expression (especially violent abridgements) be-
come part of the group’s broader message:98 This is what we wanted
to say and this is how the police prevented us from expressing our
ideas and making ourselves heard.
C. The Nature and Myth of Video Evidence
Video evidence is uniquely important in civil rights actions aris-
ing from police-public confrontations.  Police-public confrontations
often are he-said, she-said cases, turning on the competing testimony
of the officer and the citizen, who are the only two witnesses to the
contested events.99  There is a notably strong tendency for courts and
juries to view the police officer’s testimony as more credible.100  Simi-
larly, protest cases involve rapidly developing events in a large crowd
of people, making perception difficult and potentially less than fully
accurate.  Video might capture a broader picture of events at a public
rally, providing more information than a few individual witnesses
could convey.
95. See Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 22. R
96. See supra notes 13–16, 22, 23–24 and accompanying text. R
97. ZICK, supra note 3, at 257; see also SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 164 (emphasizing the R
ease with which people can post pictures and videos).
98. ZICK, supra note 3, at 255–57. R
99. See Drizin & Reich, supra note 3, at 624–25 (arguing that, absent police interroga- R
tions being monitored, courts must “rely heavily on swearing contests between the officers
and suspects,” with courts being forced to decide “whose version of what occurred in the
interrogation room was more credible”); Simmons, supra note 1, at 565 (stating that most R
police conduct cases involve only two witnesses: the police officer and the suspect).
100. David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455,
471–72 (1999); Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5, at 495; Simmons, supra note 1, at 565. But see R
Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 123–24 (suggesting that legislative proposals requiring R
the recording of custodial interrogations reflect “a general distrust of police tactics and a
fear of wrongly accused or convicted defendants”).
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As with much civil litigation, there rarely is complete certainty
with regard to what happened in these encounters;101 speculation by
the fact-finder is inevitable in determining which witnesses to believe
and which evidence to credit.  In such cases, Martin Redish argues,
“[w]e refer to the jury’s verdict as the ‘accurate’ result, but this is sim-
ply a convenient method by which we operationalize accuracy, be-
cause we simply have no choice.”102  But calling the result accurate
does not change that some amount of speculation and guesswork un-
derlie the decision.
We purportedly want certainty, however.  Video evidence pur-
ports to offer greater certainty by replacing he-said, she-said proof
with proof that at least seems to make the fact-finder an eyewitness
with first-hand experience of the events as they occurred in the real
world.103  Because video images appear to provide a “direct, un-
mediated view of the reality they depict,” viewers are more likely to
accept them as “credible representations” of reality.104  Video images,
Richard Sherwin argues, “transform argument” and thus can “per-
suade all the more powerfully,” generating less counterargument and
retaining the viewers’ belief.105  Video purports to be an objective, un-
biased, transparent observer of events that evenhandedly reproduces
reality for the viewer; it purports to be raw, unambiguous, and unbi-
ased evidence incontrovertibly showing what happened in the real
world.106  From an evidentiary standpoint, video evidence often will be
overwhelming proof at trial and throughout litigation, as it is more
likely to convince the jury and the court.  It also may be more likely to
convince the parties to make strategic choices, fearing the difficulty of
countering the persuasive power of video evidence.
101. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 565 (“A recurring problem in regulating the practice R
of law enforcement agents . . . is . . . simply determining exactly what happened.”).
102. Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litiga-
tion Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1352 (2005).
103. See Richard K. Sherwin, Introduction, in POPULAR CULTURE AND LAW xiv (Richard K.
Sherwin ed., 2006) (discussing the “peculiar efficacy of . . . visual persuasion” and viewers’
“belief that they are perceiving reality”); Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 519 (arguing that R
courts treat surveillance tapes as if video was an “unimpeachable eyewitness” or “merely an
extension of the jury’s eye”); Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 124 (arguing that viewers R
of custodial interrogation recordings “believe [that] they are witnessing the events”);  Sim-
mons, supra note 1, at 567 (arguing that video evidence provides judges with “a clear, R
neutral factual record”).
104. Sherwin, supra note 103, at xiv. R
105. Id.  Sherwin also argues that video evidence persuades more effectively because
video tends to arouse cognitive and emotional responses, and persuasion works through
reason and emotion.  Id.
106. Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 508–09; Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 18; R
Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 111, 127. R
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The certainty that video purports to provide, however, is more
myth than reality.  Silbey calls video proof “evidence verite´, filmic evi-
dence that purports to be unmediated and unselfconscious film foot-
age of actual events.”107  Courts and advocates frequently assume that
video is the event itself, when, in fact, it only is further evidence of the
event.108  Video may be more persuasive because of its cognitive power
to “transform[ ] viewers into eyewitnesses,” but it remains simply an-
other form of evidence.109  Video, “like any representational form,
must be interpreted,” accounting for “its specific language, [and] its
ways of making meaning.”110  No video is unambiguous or singular in
its meaning or significance; the viewer of a video must evaluate and
interpret its message, as with any other form of evidence or testi-
mony.111  And interpretation must overcome the inherent limits of
the video’s frame; for example, the video’s picture may not show what
happened outside the camera’s view or the causation for actions
shown or what depended on “the camera’s perspective (angles) and
breadth of view (wide shots and focus).”112
This is not to reject all video evidence, inside or outside the court-
room.  Within litigation, additional probative evidence is always desir-
able in the search for truth.  Video constitutes an important
complement to witness testimony and other evidence, providing addi-
tional supporting or competing evidence.113  Many commentators
thus support efforts to increase police-controlled recording of interro-
gations, confessions, and public encounters.114  And legal rules should
protect the public’s ability to make recordings.115
This is to urge a degree of caution with respect to the use of video
evidence, a degree of humility on the viewer’s part, and a reluctance
to treat video evidence as the final, unambiguous account of events.116
Courts should not treat recording evidence as the “proverbial smok-
107. Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 507. R
108. Id. at 519; Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 17–18, 20. R
109. Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 25. R
110. Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 173. R
111. Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 519; Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 25–26, R
45 (“[Video] is but a slice of that occurrence; it is necessarily partial and, therefore, no
more immune to critical analysis regarding prejudice and probative value than any other
documentary or testimonial proffer.”).
112. Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 29, 38. R
113. See Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 114 (arguing that video is useful in that it R
provides another version of the events).
114. See supra notes 5–9, 54–55 and accompanying text. R
115. See infra Part V.
116. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 897–99 (arguing that courts should exert “a form R
of judicial humility” in order to “compensate for the partiality” and to “avoid cultural parti-
sanship”); Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 26 (arguing that courts should treat R
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ing gun,” as an unimpeachable witness “testifying to the only version
of what happened.”117  Nor should the jury or the court use video as
an excuse to respond to, and decide cases on, “brute sense impres-
sions” of the video.118  We cannot disregard the ordinary rules of evi-
dence and procedure when dealing with video evidence.  Instead, the
judiciary, litigants, and policymakers must strike a careful balance be-
tween using video as an important evidentiary and expressive tool,
while recognizing video’s limitations, and potentially overweening
power, as evidence.119
III. VIDEO EVIDENCE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT: SCOTT V. HARRIS AND
ITS DISCONTENTS
Modern technology enables the people to watch the government
and the government to watch the people, providing useful evidence
when events being watched form the basis of constitutional litigation.
But limits on the evidentiary usefulness of such video cannot be ig-
nored and must be incorporated into our basic understanding of the
litigation process.  The increasing prevalence of recordings of police-
public encounters from various sources heightens the back-end im-
portance of video proof in Section 1983 litigation arising from such
encounters.  The tension between the persuasive power and the myths
regarding video evidence affects civil rights litigation in several
respects.
The goal in civil rights and constitutional litigation must be to
harness the evidentiary power of video without falling prey to its weak-
nesses.  We can adopt an extension of an argument made by Silbey:
Although recording all types of police-public interactions promotes
justice and should be encouraged, the recording of a police-public
encounter is merely “one version of the events . . . of which there are
likely many.”120
video evidence as presenting “the same types of testimonial risks that traditional hearsay
restrictions attempt to minimize”).
117. Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 519, 550; see also Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note R
3, at 19 (contending that, due to the assertive nature of video evidence, an advocate should R
cross-examine film just as an advocate would cross-examine a witness).
118. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 903. R
119. See Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 26 (arguing that video “requires the R
same cross-examination as a percipient witness to test its truth and accuracy”); Silbey, Film-
making, supra note 5, at 114 (arguing that recorded interrogatories are best seen as a lim- R
ited, “state-sponsored documentary”).
120. Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 114; see also Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, R
at 25–26 (arguing that film is only one version of the events).
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Silbey has argued at length that courts and juries over-emphasize
video proof at trial, giving it great, arguably undue, weight in finding
facts and reaching decisions.121  To analyze the impact in constitu-
tional cases, it is necessary to examine how courts handle video evi-
dence in pre-trial processes such as summary judgment, where the
goal is not to weigh evidence or to find facts, but to preview evidence
to determine if there are any genuine factual disputes worthy of
trial.122  Indeed, summary judgment activity has become increasingly
common in civil rights cases.  A recent Federal Judicial Center study
reported summary judgment activity in twenty-eight of every one hun-
dred civil rights cases, with seventy percent of summary judgment mo-
tions being granted in whole or in part in these cases.123  The
potential misuse and abuse of video threatens to further expand sum-
mary judgment in civil rights cases.
A. Scott v. Harris and Summary Judgment
Scott was a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arising from
a ten-mile, six-minute, high-speed police chase that ended when the
pursuing officer rammed the suspect’s car from behind, causing the
suspect to lose control of the car, which then left the roadway, went
down an embankment, and overturned, rendering the driver a
quadriplegic.124  The defendant officer moved for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.125
The driver, Harris, and the officer, Deputy Scott, presented
sharply divergent versions of the chase.126  Conflicting witness ac-
counts ordinarily preclude summary judgment, as the fact-finder
should choose between competing testimony.127  Indeed, on a motion
121. Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 24 (arguing that too many courts grant video R
evidence conclusive weight, viewing video evidence as “perfectly clear” and unbiased); see,
e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding no error in the
trial court’s admittance of the videotape).
122. See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 653–54
(2005) (tracing steps in pre-trial previews of the merits of civil claims).
123. Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to the Honorable
Michael Baylson, at 6 tbl.3 (June 15, 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf.  Section 1983 cases involving police apparently
fall in the category of “other civil rights.”  According to this Federal Judicial Center study,
in Fiscal Year 2006, there were more than 14,000 “other civil rights” cases, and more than
3,900 summary judgment motions filed in these cases. Id.; see also John Bronsteen, Against
Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 529 & n.38, 537 (2007) (discussing the
frequency of summary judgment motions).
124. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (2007).
125. Id. at 1773.
126. Id. at 1774.
127. Id.
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for summary judgment, the court must view all facts and draw reasona-
ble inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant.128  In
qualified immunity cases, this means that the court adopts the plain-
tiff’s version of the facts.129  When evaluating a motion for summary
judgment, a court should not weigh evidence or make credibility de-
terminations.130  Instead, the court should assume that the jury
“would not believe any of the moving party’s witnesses” and would
believe the non-movant’s witnesses, and evaluate whether a reasonable
jury could resolve the case in the non-movant’s favor based on the
evidence viewed accordingly.131
But the Scott Court granted summary judgment because of the
case’s “added wrinkle”—a video of the chase, taken from the pursuing
squad car.132  The Court insisted, without citation, that when oppos-
ing parties tell divergent stories but one of those stories is “blatantly
contradicted by the record,” a court should not rely on a “visible fic-
tion,” a version of events “so utterly discredited by the record,” when
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.133  The video told the
Court a story that “quite clearly contradict[ed] [Harris’s] . . . ver-
sion.”134  Based on that view of the video, the Court disregarded the
ordinary requirement that the court view facts and evidence in favor
of the non-movant, holding instead that the court view the facts “in
the light depicted by the videotape.”135  Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Scalia saw in the video “a Hollywood-style car chase of the most
frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike
at great risk of serious injury.”136  The video-driven conclusion was
that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.137
In relying on the chase video to grant the defendant summary
judgment, the majority departed from typical, and arguably appropri-
128. Id. at 1774–75; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970).
129. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775.
130. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 255 (1986).
131. Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in
Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 781–82 (1988).
132. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775–76.
133. Id. at 1776.
134. Id. at 1775.
135. See id. at 1776.
136. Id. at 1775–76.
137. Id. at 1776.  The precise issue in Scott was whether the court should have found that
the officer was entitled to qualified immunity, which involved a two-part analysis: (1)
whether the presented facts demonstrated that the officer’s conduct violated a constitu-
tional right; and (2) if so, whether that right “‘was clearly established [at the time] . . . in
light of the specific factual context of the case.’” Id. at 1774 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). But cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (holding that
a merits-first approach to qualified immunity no longer is mandatory).
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ate, summary judgment analysis in two respects.  First, the Court ig-
nored the plaintiff’s testimony in favor of the video; testimonial
evidence simply was inaccurate and wrong and could be disregarded
because it conflicted with what the Court itself saw in the video.138
The video told the majority a single incontrovertible story that could
not be disputed or questioned by the plaintiff’s mere testimony.  The
video constituted such strong, singular, objective, and conclusive
proof that it eliminated all factual disputes created.  The video was
true, complete, fully contextual, and accurate, and depicted one clear
and obvious set of facts that told one story.  Other evidence and inter-
pretations of the video were necessarily inaccurate.  No reasonable
jury could believe the plaintiff’s version of events, if told on the wit-
ness stand, in the face of the contrary story affirmed by watching the
recording.  All evidence other than the video was procedurally irrele-
vant and none could make the case worthy of trial.
Second, the Court decided what the video evidence demon-
strated and meant, and disregarded any alternate interpretations or
understandings of the video.139  This is inconsistent with the summary
judgment requirement that individual pieces of evidence be con-
strued in the light most favorable to the non-movant.  If the video
reasonably could have been interpreted in a way that would tell a story
favorable to the plaintiff’s claim, the Court was obligated to adopt that
understanding for summary judgment purposes.  Stated differently,
the majority’s view of the video was the only reasonable one; any other
understanding of the video and its story was unreasonable, as was any
juror who could hold such an understanding.140
Both departures reflect a procedural faith in video evidence,
standing alone, as an unassailable source of proof, enabling the Court
to conclude that video obviated a fact-finder.  In other words, Justice
Scalia bought into the myths of video evidence.  As Silbey argues,
there is no singular and complete set of facts depicted in any photo,
video, or audio recording.141  Video cannot “speak for itself,” as Jus-
tice Scalia suggested it should.142  It requires interpretation, infer-
ence, and exegesis by the viewer to understand what the video is
saying.143  Nor is the story the video told necessarily complete or fully
138. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
139. Id. at 1774–76.
140. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 897–98. R
141. See Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 25 (arguing that “[f]ilmic evidence is R
not an unambiguous representation of events”).
142. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5; Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 25. R
143. See Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 26 (explaining that film images must be R
evaluated and tested); supra notes 100–119 and accompanying text. R
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contextual—it did not show what was happening off-camera, what
happened before the camera began running, or the cause of the ac-
tions we see and hear on the video.144
This was the larger point in Justice Stevens’s sharp dissent.  He
watched the same video, but saw a different event—not only did he
doubt the presence of danger to pedestrians, drivers, parked cars, or
property from the chase, he did not see any “close calls.”145  The dif-
ferences between what the video said to the majority and what it said
to Justice Stevens go to the singularity and completeness of the video’s
story.146  Consider several examples.  The majority insisted that the
suspect ran several red lights, while Justice Stevens concluded that the
video merely showed that the lights were red when the pursuing po-
lice car went through them, but did not show the lights when the lead
car went through some distance ahead.147  The majority saw the chase
threatening other cars and drivers, who had to quickly pull to the side
to get out of the way of the speeding suspect, while Justice Stevens
viewed most of the cars as already having pulled over, possibly in re-
sponse to the police siren.148  The majority saw Harris swerving into
oncoming traffic, while Justice Stevens saw him signaling and making
a routine passing maneuver on a two-lane road, albeit at a high rate of
speed.149
One video told the majority and the dissent two stories.  The ma-
jority’s insistence that courts view facts and evidence “in the light de-
picted by the videotape” is incoherent because there is no single,
unambiguous, and complete set of facts depicted in the videotape.
The video’s meaning, and its consistency with testimony, depended
on interpretation; different interpretations of the video, and thus of
its consistency with Harris’ testimony, were possible by reasonable
viewers.  The Court therefore was procedurally obligated to recognize
144. See Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 28–29, 38–39. R
145. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1783 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 19 (“Justice Stevens recognized that a filmic R
representation of events is monocular, but the chase itself—and the reality of the event
that is at the heart of the adjudicatory proceeding—is, by its nature, multi-ocular.”).
147. Compare Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775 (majority opinion), with id. at 1782 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
148. Compare id. at 1775 (majority opinion), with id. at 1782 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by two or three
images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or explosions, but were in fact
merely the headlights of vehicles zooming by in the opposite lane.  Had they learned to
drive when most high-speed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on super-
highways—when split-second judgments about the risk of passing a slow-poke in the face of
oncoming traffic were routine—they might well have reacted to the videotape more
dispassionately.”).
149. Compare id. at 1775 (majority opinion), with id. at 1783 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the possibility of some interpretation of the video favorable to the
plaintiff and consistent with his testimony.  Such an interpretation
leaves a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harris posed an
immediate threat to persons and property and, therefore, whether
Deputy Scott acted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment when
he rammed Harris’s car, all rendering summary judgment
inappropriate.150
B. An Empirical Take on Scott: Effects of Culture on Cognition
If Silbey’s insight is that Scott is problematic because video evi-
dence is typically ambiguous and has meaning only through viewer
interpretation and construction,151 then the substantial insight from
the study conducted by Dan Kahan, Dave Hoffman, and Dan Braman
is that Scott is problematic because this interpretation and construc-
tion will be highly contextualized and individualized, affected by view-
ers’ identity-defining characteristics, such as race, age, sex, socio-
economic status, education, cultural orientation, ideology, and politi-
cal party affiliation.152
Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman showed the video to a diverse, na-
tionally representative sample of individuals (i.e., potential jurors, had
such a case gotten past summary judgment and proceeded to trial),
and then asked a series of questions about the video that roughly
tracked the basic factual issues underlying the material fact of whether
Harris, by leading police on this chase, endangered the public,
thereby making Deputy Scott’s use of force reasonable for Fourth
Amendment and qualified immunity purposes.153  They then used in-
novative statistical applications to generate four model jurors, possess-
ing different combinations of cultural and demographic
characteristics, and showed how these four jurors viewed the video.154
The study found what the authors called “constrained dissen-
sus.”155  A “very sizable majority” agreed with the Scott majority as to
150. Summary judgment was inappropriate at least as to whether a violation had oc-
curred.  Had the Court recognized the reasonableness of a more plaintiff-favorable inter-
pretation of the video, it still could have granted summary judgment on a finding that the
right to be free of the use of deadly force in the context of a high-speed chase in which the
officer perceived the fleeing driver to pose a threat to persons and property in the vicinity
was not clearly established.
151. See Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 508; Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 18, R
25.
152. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 879. R
153. Id. at 854–56.
154. Id. at 870–79.
155. Id. at 879.
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most of the underlying questions about the threat Harris posed to the
public and as to the ultimate conclusion that the officer’s use of
deadly force was reasonable.156  However, the extremes of the spec-
trum—the small minority who disagreed about the appropriateness of
deadly force and the minority who agreed most unequivocally with
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion—all were connected by core identity-
defining characteristics.  Race, income, education, ideology, cultural
worldviews, and party affiliation all corresponded with variations in
perception of the images depicted and story told in the video.157  The
Scott video, as with other facts and other evidence, did not speak for
itself; it spoke “only against the background of pre-existing under-
standings of social reality that invest[ed] those facts with meaning.”158
These results led the authors to conclude that the Scott Court was
wrong to grant summary judgment.  By insisting that the video sup-
ported only “one ‘reasonable’ view of the facts,” the Court effectively
told those who might draw a different story from the video that their
viewpoint was unreasonable.159  The Court thus rendered a decision
“symptomatic of a kind of cognitive bias that is endemic to legal and
political decision-making and that needlessly magnifies cultural con-
flict over and discontent with the law.”160
The authors identify and emphasize a broader problem with the
procedural posture of Scott.  It was not simply that Justice Scalia failed
to interpret the video in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, ig-
noring possible disagreements as to the video’s meaning, possible con-
trary evidence, and possible variance of jury results.161  The problem
was the nature of the dissensus surrounding the facts revealed by the
video and the interpretation of those facts.  The video and the facts on
the ground would be interpreted “against the background of compet-
ing, subcommunity understandings of social reality.”162  Rather than
being mere “idiosyncratic statistical outliers,” study participants who
interpreted the video and its story differently were members of groups
“who share a distinctive understanding of social reality against which
the facts have a meaning different . . . from what it has for the major-
ity.”163  In granting summary judgment in the face of such subcom-
munity-specific disagreement, the Court “inevitably called into
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 883.
159. Id. at 902.
160. Id. at 881.
161. See supra notes 137–150 and accompanying text. R
162. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 883. R
163. Id. at 886.
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question the integrity, intelligence, and competence of identifiable
subcommunities whose members in fact held those dissenting be-
liefs.”164  That, in turn, causes those dissenters, and members of the
public who share their identity-defining characteristics, to question
the legitimacy of resulting law.165
The study led the authors to broader normative conclusions
about summary judgment.166  Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman argued
for a form of “judicial humility” on summary judgment, under which a
judge performs a “mental double-check” before granting summary
judgment based on her sensory reactions to evidence, precisely to
avoid decisions turning on simple brute-sense impressions that may be
culturally bound.167  The judge must imagine potential jurors and if
“they are people who bear recognizable identity-defining characteris-
tics—demographic, cultural, political, or otherwise—she should stop
and think hard.”168  Judges should at least hesitate before endorsing
any “culturally partisan views of facts” or summarily deciding cases
that likely would feature “culturally polarized understandings of
fact.”169  This humility is a procedural form of Alexander Bickel’s “pas-
sive virtues,” in which courts use caution in exercising even the un-
questioned power to decide a case on summary judgment, with some
deference to concerns for public perceptions of, and respect for the
legitimacy of, law and courts.170
The authors attempted to downplay the limits that this new con-
cern for cultural cognition imposes on summary judgment, arguing
that courts should rarely feel obligated to apply this “prudential
brake” in a case otherwise fit for summary disposition.  As they
explained:
[T]here’s nothing problematic about a court deciding sum-
marily based on its sensory impressions when the factual in-
ference it is drawing isn’t one that is likely to divide potential
164. Id. at 897; see also id. at 887 (stating that the decision “denied a dissenting group of
citizens the respect they are owed”).
165. Id. at 887. But see Christopher Slobogin, The Perils of the Fight Against Cognitive Illiber-
alism, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 3 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/
122/jan09/slobogin.shtml (expressing doubt that the public would be outraged by, or
likely to question the legitimacy of, a Fourth Amendment case such as Scott).
166. This is true of all summary adjudication procedures, including judgment as a mat-
ter of law, which utilizes the same standard as summary judgment, and failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 881–82 n.129. R
167. Id. at 897–98.
168. Id. at 898.
169. Id. at 899–900.
170. Id. at 899 (discussing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SU-
PREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962)). But see Slobogin, supra note 165, at 3. R
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jurors on cultural lines . . . . By the same token, where a
factual inference would likely provoke cultural dissensus, our
argument would counsel the judge not to draw it even if the
basis for the inference is something other than her mere sen-
sory impression.171
But their normative argument for caution in the face of stigmatizing
cultural dissensus leads to the more dramatic conclusion that sum-
mary judgment will be far less appropriate in civil rights and civil liber-
ties actions.  This is particularly true for cases arising from police-
public encounters that are “fraught with competing connotations in
our society.”172  Nothing obviously distinguishes Scott from cases aris-
ing from other fraught, coercive police-public encounters, any of
which can be a “potentially divisive matter in our society.”173  Con-
cerns of race, class, and gender color all experiences with law enforce-
ment.  Political party affiliation and ideology affect views on
appropriate political expression and whether police acted appropri-
ately when dealing with protesters.  Ideology influences views on the
entire freedom-order-security divide, and thus one’s views on the pro-
priety of limits and restrictions on unpopular speech in public spaces.
This “prudential brake” becomes especially prominent in a substantial
number of civil rights video cases, where culturally based cognition
affects an individual viewer’s understanding of the recording and its
story.
Which is not necessarily to disagree with that normative conclu-
sion.  Scholarly criticism of summary judgment is on the rise, concur-
rent with the overall increase in summary judgment activity in federal
court.174  Many critics focus particular attention on the disparately
171. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 900–01. R
172. Id. at 886.
173. Id. at 896.
174. See Bronsteen, supra note 123, at 526 (arguing for the abandonment of summary R
judgment “even if we are not constitutionally obligated to do so”); Stephen Burbank, Vanishing
Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Towards Bethlehem or Gomorrah, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 622 (2004) (discussing recent scholarship demonstrating that
“something is amiss, perhaps gravely amiss, in the approaches that some courts take to the
interpretation and application of Rule 56”); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein,
Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 89 (1990) (discussing evidence
that shows that “summary judgment has moved beyond its originally intended role as a
guarantor of the existence of material issues to be resolved at trial and has been trans-
formed into a mechanism to assess the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing at trial”); Arthur
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and
Efficiency Cliche´s Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982,
1063 (2003) (arguing that it is “rare for a court to find that the party seeking summary
judgment has failed to discharge its initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact”); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L.
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heavy use of the procedure in civil rights litigation.175
But the “prudential brake” that Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman
propose bucks a twenty-five-year doctrinal trend in which summary
judgment has been made more obtainable in Section 1983 actions.  In
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,176 the Supreme Court altered the standard for the
defense of executive qualified immunity by shifting from a focus on
the defendant’s subjective intent to violate rights to an objective focus
on whether a reasonable officer would have known, in light of the
current state of the law, that his conduct violated the plaintiff’s clearly
established constitutional rights.177  Denials of summary judgment on
official and governmental immunity grounds are subject to immediate
appellate review, a departure from the ordinary requirement of a final
judgment.178  This gives the court of appeals, and perhaps the Su-
preme Court, a second crack at viewing and interpreting the video
evidence.  The express purpose of these doctrinal moves was to make
it easier for officers to defeat weak constitutional claims at the sum-
mary judgment stage, enabling them to get out of litigation at the
earliest possible moment and to get on with performing their public
duties without the distractions of civil litigation.179
C. Lower Courts Post-Scott
One expected consequence of Scott is that lower court “judges
might well feel emboldened to give more decisive weight to the factual
inferences they themselves are inclined to draw from videos.”180  In
fact, a sampling of cases since Scott shows lower court judges vigorously
REV. 139, 140 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is unconstitutional); Patricia M.
Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1938 (1998) (“This unseemly rush to
summary judgment may cause the legal profession, and the public at large, to conclude
that disfavored plaintiffs are apt to be hustled out of the courthouse.”).
175. Thomas, supra note 174, at 141; see also Miller, supra note 174, at 1133 (arguing that R
“an unfettered commitment to ‘efficiency’ in the pretrial disposition context . . . will erode
other systemic values”); cf. supra note 123 and accompanying text. R
176. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
177. Id. at 818–19.
178. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006) (providing that orders denying quali-
fied immunity are immediately appealable); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27
(1985) (stating that the same reasoning that supports the immediate appealability of deni-
als of absolute immunity applies to qualified immunity).
179. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525–26; see also
Miller, supra note 174, at 1133 (arguing that courts have been directed “to increase the R
disposition of cases under Rule 56 either to protect defendants or to achieve systemic
efficiency”).
180. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 59. R
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wielding this new power.181  Some courts do recognize that context
matters, that recordings may not tell the entire story182 and may re-
quire viewer interpretation that injects ambiguity into the video.183
Other courts recognize ambiguity in theory, but apply the absolute
rule of Scott in fact.  One district court agreed that “video recording
reflects a particular point of view and has its limitations,” but granted
summary judgment based on the video anyway, because “[t]hese basic
elements of hermeneutic theory” did not prevent a court from grant-
ing summary judgment when video was uncontradicted.184
A good example of how lower courts have run with the Scott-sanc-
tioned power to grant summary judgment largely on brute-sense judi-
cial perception of video is the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Marvin v. City of Taylor.185  The case in-
volved claims of excessive force in arresting the plaintiff on a DUI
charge and transporting him to the police station, where he was
booked and processed.186  Most of the events at the station house were
videotaped and, in reversing the denial of the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the court used the videos as the sole touchstone
for its factual analysis.187
The court actually went beyond Scott, utilizing an approach under
which a plaintiff could only survive summary judgment if the video, as
the court viewed and understood it, affirmatively showed what the
court viewed as excessive force.  Two portions of the opinion are par-
ticularly troubling.  First, the plaintiff alleged that one of the defen-
dant officers pulled him out of the car at the station house and threw
him to the ground, and the plaintiff insisted that the video supported
this contention.188  But the court held that the video did not show this
so clearly.  Rather, according to the court, the video, taken from the
181. See Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 2007); Mecham v. Frazier,
500 F.3d 1200, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1262 n.1,
1263 nn.2–3 (11th Cir. 2007); Marion v. City of Corydon, No. 4:07-cv-0003-DFH-WGH,
2008 WL 763211, at *1 & n.1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2008).
182. York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2008).
183. Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561–62 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Green v.
N.J. State Police, 246 F. App’x 158, 159 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Unlike in Scott . . . the video-
tape evidence is inconclusive on several of the key disputed facts.”); Stewart v. City of New
York, No. 06 Civ. 15490(RMB)(FM), 2008 WL 1699797, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2008)
(“Here, by comparison, the issue is not what [plaintiff] said, but what he intended.  Unlike
the speed of a car, the meaning behind [plaintiff]’s statements is not capable of being
captured on a videotape or audiotape.”).
184. Marion, 2008 WL 763211, at *1 & n.1.
185. 509 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007).
186. Id. at 237–43.
187. Id. at 239–42.
188. Id. at 240, 248.
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opposite side of the car and not offering a clear view, only showed the
officer opening the door, reaching into the car, closing the door, then
bending down and helping the plaintiff to his feet; it did not show the
police “abusing” the plaintiff.189  Thus, although the video did not bla-
tantly contradict the plaintiff’s assertions, it did not support them and,
by not supporting his version, it “certainly cast[ ] strong doubts on
[his] characterization.”190
Second, the plaintiff testified that the officers had gratuitously
pulled his injured arm into the small of his back while taking off the
handcuffs from behind.191  According to the court, while the video
appeared to show the plaintiff’s arms being raised into the small of his
back, the officer also could be seen crouching to insert the key to
unlock the cuffs, presumably to avoid making the plaintiff raise his
arms.192  Based on the video, the court concluded that “the officers’
conduct cannot reasonably be construed as gratuitous.”193
Nothing requires the recording to affirmatively support the plain-
tiff’s version of events; his testimony about being shoved to the floor
should be enough to get that issue to the jury, at least absent the type
of video contradiction purportedly present in Scott.194  Moreover, the
video shows the plaintiff having to be picked up off the ground by the
officer, although it does not show why he was on the ground.195  View-
ing the video in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the court
should be obligated to do, gives rise to a reasonable inference that the
plaintiff was on the ground and had to be picked up because, per the
plaintiff’s testimony, the officer had pushed him down.  In other
words, a reasonable “plaintiff-sided” interpretation of the video, which
is inconclusive because of the limits of the video frame, is fully consis-
tent with the plaintiff’s testimony.  Similarly, to the extent the video
shows both the plaintiff’s injured arms being lifted into the small of
his back and the officer bending down to unlock the handcuffs, the
video is ambiguous and capable of an interpretation that supports ei-
ther side, requiring the court to accept the plaintiff-favorable interpre-
tation for purposes of summary judgment.
189. Id. at 248–49.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 240–41.
192. Id. at 241.
193. Id. at 240–41.
194. Cf. York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that
where plaintiff’s testimony is not blatantly contradicted by recording, the recording alone
does not establish defendants’ entitlement to summary judgment).
195. Marvin, 509 F.3d at 248–49.
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Scott and its progeny err in permitting judicial determination of
videos’ meanings to trump witness testimony, failing to recognize the
possibility of competing reasonable constructions of video, consistent
with that testimony, under which a plaintiff might prevail at trial.196
Marvin takes this procedural faith a step further by elevating video
evidence to the only competent evidence on summary judgment.  The
court expected, and in fact demanded, video that unassailably estab-
lished the facts in the plaintiff’s favor; absent video that did so, the
plaintiff’s claim did not warrant trial, regardless of what any non-video
testimonial evidence showed and regardless of any ambiguity or un-
certainty about the video.  If video is in the record, ordinary testi-
mony, especially by the plaintiff himself, is no longer sufficient.  The
video alone must prove the plaintiff’s case to the court’s satisfaction in
order to proceed beyond summary adjudication.
D. The Flip Side of Summary Judgment
Suppose we turn Scott on its head.  Imagine a case in which brute-
sense impressions suggest the video supports the plaintiff’s version of
events and shows a constitutional violation or where it is the defen-
dant’s testimony that is “blatantly contradicted” by the video.  If,
under Scott, a court can ignore as a “visible fiction” plaintiff testimony
that is contradicted by the video, why should the court not be able to
do the same with similarly incredible or contradicted testimony from
the defendant?  If the court must interpret facts in light of (its under-
standing of) the video, why should it not do the same with a video
that, on brute-sense viewing, seems to disfavor the defendant’s story?
At a minimum, this compels the court to deny the defendant-
officer’s request for summary judgment.  For example, in Combs v.
Town of Davie,197 the district court denied summary judgment in an
excessive force case because it found that details contained in the of-
ficer’s testimony (such as his statements that the suspect punched and
kicked him) were not reflected in the video, and scenes depicted in
the video (such as the suspect fleeing) were not mentioned in the
officer’s otherwise comprehensive recitation of events.198  This led the
court to question the officer’s credibility and established an issue for
trial.199
196. But cf. Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1269–71 & nn.3, 7–10 (Presnell, J., con-
curring) (attempting to frame facts from police chase video in light most favorable to
plaintiff and concluding that the plaintiff’s conduct “was not particularly heinous”).
197. No. 06-60946-CIV-COHN/SNOW, 2007 WL 879426 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2007).
198. Id. at *5.
199. Id.
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But summary judgment is a neutral procedure, available to both
parties whenever the record, including audio or video evidence, shows
there is no genuine dispute as to some material fact, and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.200  The open question
is whether a court could use its brute-sense impressions of the video or
use that blatant contradiction and loss of credibility as a basis for
granting a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.  In Combs, having
concluded that the video does not show the plaintiff punching or
kicking the officer, could the court, on a proper motion, disregard the
defendant’s testimony altogether and decide that the video actually
shows excessive force?201  Again, as a normative matter of appropriate
summary judgment processes, a court should never grant summary
judgment, in favor of either party, by interpreting and assigning
meaning to video.  Still, should a court, taking Scott at its word, have
equal latitude in granting summary judgment for the plaintiff?
The answer may properly turn on the greater burden a plaintiff
bears in seeking summary judgment on a claim as the party with the
ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.  Martin Louis long ago argued
that courts should grant summary judgment less readily when the
moving party seeks to establish as undisputed an essential element on
which she will bear the burden of proof at trial.202  A movant-plaintiff
must shift the burden of production, presenting to the court such
strong and undisputed affirmative evidence on each element of a
claim that no fact-finder could reasonably find against her.203  This is
a more substantial burden than that borne by a movant-defendant,
who only must point out to the court, without substantial support, the
absence of evidence from the plaintiff to establish just one essential
element, forcing the plaintiff to produce probative evidence that will
convince the court that a reasonable juror could find in her favor.204
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)–(b).  In practice, however, it is overwhelmingly a defense mo-
tion. See Bronsteen, supra note 123, at 523 n.10; see also id. at 538 (criticizing the one-sided, R
defendant-biased nature of summary judgment); Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note
174, at 75 (arguing that summary judgment results in a “wealth transfer from plaintiffs as a R
class to defendants as a class”).
201. Combs was decided several months prior to Scott.  The judge certainly would not
have felt the same freedom to disregard testimony in favor of video; thus, it is hard to know
how a similar case might play out post-Scott.
202. Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J.
745, 748 (1974).
203. Id. at 748–49.
204. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Friedenthal, supra note 131, at 779; Redish, supra note 102, at R
1344–45, 1351 n.81.
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But if a summary judgment court can evaluate video and audio
evidence and decide the unambiguous meaning of the recording, as
Scott and its progeny do, the different burden of production should be
irrelevant.  If a court can decide the video’s singular message, it
should be able to do so whether that message favors the plaintiff or
the defendant.  If the court decides that the video is capable of only
one reasonable interpretation in the plaintiff’s favor, it should be
equally able to disregard defendant’s testimony that is blatantly con-
tradicted by what the court sees in the video.  And absent the defen-
dant’s testimony providing a different version of the video or the
events, the video standing alone—given that it is singular and unam-
biguous and capable of only one reasonable interpretation—would be
sufficient to establish the elements of the plaintiff’s case without need
for a jury.
Of course, a court might say, as the Ninth Circuit did in the pre-
Scott case arising from the Seattle protests, that on a plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment, evidence, including video, must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the defendant.205  But Scott hinged on the
inability of a reasonable viewer to find another meaning or message in
the video.  The point was that video was so singular in its narrative that
there was no reasonable chance the jury could “disbelieve” the video
as interpreted by the court.  In other words, the jury could not draw a
different story from the video than did the court.  To the extent
courts accept this understanding of video evidence, however falla-
cious, nothing turns on who is the moving party.  There is no descrip-
tive reason a court could not make the same determination about the
video’s meaning on a plaintiff’s motion, disregard alternate interpre-
tations and competing testimony, and grant summary judgment for
the plaintiff.
Any Section 1983 action arising from the Critical Mass incident206
might squarely present this procedural situation.  A brute-sense view-
ing of that video supports the rider’s version of events.  Indeed, the
video seems to show that the officer moved several steps from the
center of the street to get close to the rider and that he threw his arm
out to hit the rider; the video thereby contradicts the officer’s initial
statements that the rider had steered the bicycle towards the officer
and rode into him.207  On the other hand, because the plaintiff-mo-
vant must affirmatively foreclose any evidentiary basis for finding in
the defendant’s favor, the officer might remain freer than the plaintiff
205. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1154 n.74 (9th Cir. 2005).
206. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. R
207. See Pogan Affidavit, supra note 24. R
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in Scott to defeat summary judgment by producing evidence justifying
his conduct that cannot be seen in the video because of its angle and
scope or because of information the video does not show.
Alternatively, a court might rely less heavily on video, as the Elev-
enth Circuit did in a recent unpublished opinion.208  A dash-mounted
camera captured an encounter on the side of a highway, during which
the officer attempted to get a seemingly drunk, despondent, and inco-
herent individual into the squad car.209  The man remained seated on
the side of the road and passively refused to be moved; the officer
tasered the suspect three times.210  In reversing the denial of the of-
ficer’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity, the ma-
jority provided a relatively sparse, undetailed, and cold recitation of
the facts (much as a court might from a written record devoid of video
evidence), accepting the officer’s testimony as true, and focusing on
the legal issue of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.211  Little was
said of the video.  On the other hand, the dissent made hay out of the
video in arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate and trial
necessary,212 describing the events on the video in great detail, includ-
ing those points in the video that appeared to contradict both the
officer’s testimony and the purportedly undisputed facts that the ma-
jority accepted.213  This convenient non-reliance on video evidence
that appears to favor the plaintiff may be more problematic than its
misuse on summary judgment.
E. Video and Summary Judgment: Some Stopping Points
Courts on summary judgment must hesitate before getting swept
away with the purported objectivity, completeness, and clarity of
video.214  But Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman also are correct that
there must be a stopping point to this reluctance to grant summary
208. Buckley v. Haddock, No. 07-10988, 2008 WL 4140297, at *1 n.1 (11th Cir. Sept. 9,
2008).
209. Id. at *1–*2.
210. Id.  The video was posted to YouTube shortly after the decision was released. See
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SWC7iSGCk-s (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
211. Buckley, 2008 WL 4140297, at *1–*3.
212. The dissent did not address whether the plaintiff should be entitled to summary
judgment had he moved for it.
213. Buckley, 2008 WL 4140297, at *10 & nn.6–7 (Martin, J., dissenting).
214. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 899 (arguing that “judges pause to consider R
whether what strikes them as an ‘obvious’ matter of fact might in fact be viewed otherwise
by a discrete and identifiable subcommunity”); Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at R
22–23; Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 114 (arguing that film should be considered “as R
one version of the events . . . of which there are likely many”); supra notes 107–119 and R
accompanying text.
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judgment in video cases—“the upshot can’t be that judges should
never trust their own perceptions of the facts when determining
whether to resolve cases summarily.”215  Nor should it be that judges
never can grant summary judgment in civil rights video cases, particu-
larly as such cases increase in number with the spread of recording
technology among all actors.  The point is not the elimination of
video evidence, which does promote justice, if only by providing addi-
tional probative evidence.216  Video replaces the he-said, he-said trial
by providing additional evidence for the fact-finder to balance against
competing testimonial versions of events.  The point, again, is cau-
tion—a degree of humility in how courts respond to what they see or
understand from the recording and hesitancy before letting video evi-
dence overwhelm the analysis.
Several considerations illuminate the boundaries of summary
judgment and demonstrate how courts exceed those boundaries by
over-relying on judicial perceptions of video evidence, especially as to
police misconduct cases.
First, much turns on the type and complexity of the facts being
proven through video.  The material fact in deadly force cases such as
Scott—the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in a police-public
encounter217—is a complex and layered issue.  It depends on a host of
underlying factual considerations.  These include whether the suspect
posed an immediate threat to police, persons, and property in the
surrounding area, which in turn depends on a series of prior factual
conclusions about the real-world events on the ground drawn from
viewing the video.218  Such complex, layered factual determinations
are particularly dependent on viewer interpretation of video, thus
more subject to culturally and demographically based differences in
perception of that video; a court in that case should be less willing to
rely solely on its brute-sense impressions of the video’s singularity of
215. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 894. R
216. See Drizin & Reich, supra note 3, at 624 (“[R]ecordings of interrogations . . . allow R
factfinders, prosecutors, and experts the ability to determine for themselves the reliability
of the confession.”); Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5, at 494–95 (noting that in the context of R
interrogations, “[t]he existence of an exact record . . . is crucial for determining the volun-
tariness and reliability of any confession statement”); Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at R
114 n.21, 116, 123–24 (providing examples of how video recordings promote criminal jus-
tice); Simmons, supra note 1, at 565–66 (arguing that recordings of interrogations make it R
easier to “determin[e] exactly what happened”); supra notes 113–115 and accompanying R
text.
217. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260,
1266 (11th Cir. 2007).
218. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778–79.  Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman structured their study to
capture that pyramid of facts. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 854–58. R
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meaning in the face of possible, culturally grounded alternative
meanings.
Justice Stevens’s argument in Scott was that portions of the video
could be viewed as consistent with Harris’s testimony that he re-
mained in control of his car at all times; the video showed that he did
signal his lane changes and that many cars appeared to have pulled
over before the speeding cars reached them.219  Similarly, in Beshers v.
Harrison,220 a filmed high-speed police chase case on all fours with
Scott, the concurring judge emphasized portions of the video showing
that the fleeing suspect made an effort to avoid hitting other cars dur-
ing the chase, suggesting he posed less of a danger to the public.221
Alternatively, even if the underlying events depicted in the video are
undisputed, the objective reasonableness of the officer’s actions, for
Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity purposes, remain an
open issue.222
Conversely, some video, or the factual issues proven by video,
might be simple and unequivocal at the level of both depicted events
and constitutional meaning.  Consider a different landmark summary
judgment case: Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.223  Plaintiffs alleged a con-
spiracy between police and employees of a private restaurant to deny
service to a white civil rights worker and her African-American com-
panions and to have her arrested for vagrancy, all in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.224  The conspiracy claim turned on the fac-
tual issue of whether a police officer was present in the store during
the events at issue, which, according to the Court, permitted the jury
to infer a meeting of the minds between the officer and Kress
employees.225
219. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1782–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra notes 145–151 and accom- R
panying text.
220. 495 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).
221. Id. at 1269 & n.4 (Presnell, J., concurring).
222. See Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he question of
objective reasonableness is not for the jury to decide where the facts are uncontroverted.”).
223. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
224. Id. at 149–50, 154.  This state-private conspiracy was necessary to make the private
store into a state actor such that it can be liable under the Fourteenth Amendment, which
limits its obligations only to the state, and § 1983, which limits itself only to persons acting
under color of state law. See id. at 151–52.
225. Id. at 158–59; see also Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsider-
ing Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 123
(2006) (describing the Adickes Court’s decision to uphold the plaintiff’s argument on ap-
peal that the defendant failed to offer affirmative evidence to disprove a necessary condi-
tion of the plaintiff’s claim). But see id. at 125 (questioning whether the officer’s mere
presence in the store, without more, permitted the inference of conspiracy); David P. Cur-
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Suppose the store had been equipped with a surveillance camera
and video did not show police officers in the store.  Could a summary
judgment court ignore testimonial evidence that they had been pre-
sent, writing it off as a visible fiction “blatantly contradicted by the
video record?”  This surveillance video seems truly unequivocal on
that small point, assuming no gaps in time or frame.  But the fact to
be drawn from the video also is simpler and more easily determined.
The video also would be less subject to cultural dissensus—exper-
iences of race, gender, and ideology likely would not affect whether
one sees on the video a uniformed officer standing somewhere in the
store.
Change the hypothetical slightly.  Suppose the surveillance video
did show a police officer in the store, looking in the general direction
of the waitress.  Now the facts on the ground are less clear—was there
eye contact between them?  And even if the facts on the ground are
clear that an officer was in the store and made eye contact with an
employee, their constitutional meaning remains open to differing rea-
sonable interpretations.  Did that eye contact constitute communica-
tion between them?  Did communicative eye contact establish a
meeting of the minds not to serve plaintiff or to have her arrested?
The video does not and cannot tell us this.  It is “narratively ambigu-
ous” in that the images are clear, but their legal significance for the
competing stories being told is ambiguous.226  These ambiguities will
be filled in by culturally and identity-determined interpretation.  A
viewer’s race, gender, politics, and cultural experiences will color her
conclusions as to whether eye contact between a store owner or em-
ployee and a police officer during a lunch-counter sit-in in 1962 Jim
Crow Mississippi suggests a conspiracy not to serve a white woman sit-
ting with black students.
A second consideration is that video does not necessarily tell the
full story of the real-world events, given its limited narrative—it does
not necessarily show what happened outside the camera’s view, the
causation for actions shown in the video, what things are blocked
from the camera’s view, or what depends on the camera’s perspective,
frame, distance, and angle.227  This was a key point for Justice Stevens
rie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 72, 77–78 (1977)
(same).
226. See Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 33, 41 (discussing trial in which video R
produces competing stories and vigorous advocacy to influence a jury’s interpretation of
the film).
227. Id. at 38; Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 147, 161; supra notes 107–112 and R
accompanying text.
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in Scott228 and some courts at least attempt to remain aware of this fact
in analyzing video.  In Marvin, the court acknowledged that the sur-
veillance camera’s location at the front-right of the car could not show
what actually happened at the rear-left of the car behind an open car
door.229  But that ambiguity should have prompted the court to deny
summary judgment where the video leaves the non-moving party’s ex-
planation unchallenged.
Third is the issue of multiple or dueling audio or video evidence.
As the number and variety of sources of recording evidence expands,
multiple videos from multiple sources become increasingly likely.230
Competing videos often tell multiple stories.  What each video says
depends on differences in angles, frames, distances, and perspec-
tives.231  A court on summary judgment cannot pick one video over
another as more “accurate” or revealing a “truer” version of events
and adopt that recording as the accepted story, just as the court can-
not pick one of two competing witness accounts.  That each video tells
a different story says nothing about the accuracy of one story or an-
other.  In fact, all videos might simply be different perspectives on the
same “true” story.232  Choices must be made among competing stories
or versions of stories reflected in the various videos.  Again, however,
those choices are for a fact-finder at trial, not a court on summary
judgment.
The source of a recording also might affect viewer perception: A
viewer might interpret images differently depending on whether the
recording comes from the police, the institutional press (whose role is
to produce lasting, objective historical records), third-party bystanders
(who also may be acting akin to journalists as creators of lasting objec-
tive historical records), or the citizen involved in the encounter.
Silbey explains this as the essence of video documentary.  “With narra-
tive comes the development of voice, or point of view.  It is unavoida-
ble that films have such a voice: there is always a filmmaker whose
perspective—and not others—is being captured by the camera.”233
228. See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1782–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority’s characterization of the danger to other motorists).
229. Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 248–49 (6th Cir. 2007).
230. See supra notes 71–97 and accompanying text. R
231. See supra notes 227–229 and accompanying text. R
232. Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 34 (arguing “films that appear to tell only R
one story when in fact, like all films, they tell more than one story and less than the whole
story”); Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 147 (discussing the “by-now obvious fact that all R
stories, even true ones, can be truthfully told from different angles, with different morals
and objectives”).
233. Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 147; see also Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, R
at 29 (arguing that “[a]ll films have a point of view or voice”).
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The audience (i.e., the jury) must judge the authority of the film’s
voice to fully understand what it depicts, in part by considering the
film’s source.234
Video evidence functions more like testimony in that competing
sources with competing perspectives, and the credibility of each per-
spective, affect what a fact-finder determines to be true. Just as a sum-
mary judgment court ordinarily is precluded from deciding the
credibility of competing witnesses or from adopting one testimonial
version over another,235 it also should be precluded from doing so
with competing recordings.  If a recording’s source and perspective
are key to understanding the message and meaning of the video, it
remains a question for the jury.
The insight about video perspective as to multiple videos actually
proves the larger point about hesitancy and mental double-checks on
summary judgment.  If perspective matters, then no single video tells
a complete, singular, unambiguous, and objective story to the exclu-
sion of all other videos.  It follows that a single video does not necessa-
rily tell a complete, singular, unambiguous, and objective story to the
exclusion of all other evidence, at least as to more complex, multi-
layered factual issues.  Construction and interpretation, culturally af-
fected as they are, remain essential.
Finally, a “prudential brake”236 on summary judgment in video
and audio civil rights cases means only that more cases continue be-
yond dispositive motion.  Most settle, while some move forward to jury
trial.237  Trial may not make much practical difference.  The Kahan-
Hoffman-Braman study showed that a “very sizable majority” agreed
that the plaintiff in Scott had posed a threat to persons in the sur-
rounding area and that the use of deadly force was appropriate.238
This suggests the officer would have prevailed anyway had the case
been tried by a jury composed of citizens similar to the study subjects
or to the study’s statistically modeled jurors.
Trial itself can undermine the supposedly fixed, transparent, and
uncontroversial meaning of film because the manner in which video is
234. Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 5, at 147. R
235. See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 772 (1989) (repeating
bromide that, for purposes of summary judgment, “a single scoundrel’s testimony may
outweigh that of forty bishops”).
236. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 900. R
237. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., 2007 Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 4.10,
www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2007/all2007judicialfactsfigures.pdf/ (last visited
Mar. 17, 2009) (indicating that 4.1% of civil actions went to trial in 2007).
238. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 879. R
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viewed may change its meaning.  The most famous example of this is
the state criminal trial of the LAPD officers accused in the Rodney
King beating, where the officers were acquitted in the face of video
evidence of the assault.  One explanation for the acquittal was defense
success in attaching a new narrative and new meaning to the video.
They did this, in part, by slowing the video for frame-by-frame review
and having the officers testify to each individual action by each ac-
tor.239  Defense counsel essentially cross-examined the film, drawing
from it a different message, creating ambiguity as to its meaning, and
allowing the video to corroborate, rather than contradict, the officers’
version of events.240  One could imagine a similar trial tactic with close
examination of the chase videos in Scott or Beshers or any of the grow-
ing number of video cases.
Of course, both sides will utilize this tactic to get the video to
express their most favorable understanding of the events to the
jury.241  But that is the point of trial with live witnesses, cross examina-
tion, and a finder of fact empowered to decide credibility and choose
between legitimate competing versions of events.  Video is rendered
neutral and ambiguous, its meaning tied back to the testimony and
credibility of competing witnesses.242  The case again becomes a he-
said, he-said dispute turning on competing witness accounts, sup-
ported by competing interpretations of a video’s story, all requiring
jury resolution.243
Because video records of police-public encounters are becoming
more common244 and because video can be so quickly and widely dis-
seminated and shared,245 a greater portion of the public is likely to
239. BILL NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES: QUESTIONS OF MEANING IN CONTEMPORARY
CULTURE 22–23 (1994); see also Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 550–52 (discussing Nichols’s R
conclusions about the use of videotape in the Rodney King trial).
240. Silbey, Critics, supra note 27, at 550–52; see also Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, R
at 45 (“An effective examination of the film would have shifted the focus of the trial to all
the other evidence marshaled by the parties, most of which had more probative value than
the film itself.”).
241. Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 41 (“Advocates use film to put their story in R
the best possible light, trying to exploit what is perceived as the film’s clarity and objectiv-
ity. . . . [T]he battle over the film’s determinacy only highlighted the relative weaknesses of
each side’s story and the indeterminacy of the film.”).
242. Id. at 45.
243. See id. at 25–26 (arguing that video evidence is not unambiguous and should be
tested for truth and accuracy at trial); see also id. at 41–42 (arguing that each side’s goal is
to “fortify or destabilize the dominant story the film appears to be telling . . . by attacking
either the story that the film seems to tell through its representation of reality, or the story
that a witness on the stand narrates”).
244. See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text. R
245. See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. R
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see video and form conclusions as to what the video shows and means.
A decision granting summary judgment on a viewing that diverges
from that of some portion of the viewing population—that labels that
population’s view unreasonable—simply will offend more people.246
Ultimately, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman make a process point.
The justification for the “prudential brake” on summary judgment,
and the critique of Scott, tracks the justifications for jury trial, particu-
larly the notion that jurors beneficially bring ordinary community
morals and perspectives to produce just results.247  Law must arise
from a “process that shows due respect for their understanding of real-
ity and hence for their identities.”248  A legal result often is acceptable
to the public, or part of the public, as more democratically legitimate
precisely because ordinary citizens played the necessary role to pro-
duce the outcome.249  Factfinding, when performed by jurors of di-
verse identities and experiences, is one procedural strategy to ensure
broad respect for outcomes and their democratic legitimacy, by bring-
ing diverse identities and perspectives into the decision-making
mix.250
The process of jury deliberation preserves and promotes demo-
cratic legitimacy in cases of true cultural dissensus, when any decision
necessarily requires the elevation of one contested view of the world
over another, by ensuring that these culturally based dissents are in-
cluded and considered in the decision-making process.251  Legitimacy
is lost when courts, overreacting to the presumed objectivity and con-
clusiveness of recording evidence, take cases away from the jury, de-
priving that composite of subcommunities the opportunity to
246. Posting of Dave Hoffman to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurring
opinions.com/archives/2009/03/liptak_writes_o.html (Mar. 2, 2009, 19:40 EST). But see
Slobogin, supra note 165, at 3. R
247. JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
18 (2000); see also Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 884–86 (arguing that juries consisting of R
ordinary citizens bring a particular means of analysis into the justice system and lend legiti-
macy to the law); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 618 (1993) (arguing that the jury “serves[ ] as a political
check on the judiciary, an infuser of democratic principles into the adjudicatory process, a
barrier to oppressive conduct, and a preserver of humanity and common sense in decision-
making”); Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 55
(2001) (discussing jury’s collateral purposes of bringing a sense of the community’s stan-
dards and morals into the justice system).
248. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 885. R
249. Id. at 884.
250. Id. at 884–85; see also Landsman, supra note 247, at 619 (discussing Alexis de Toc- R
queville’s positive impression of the American jury system) (citing 1 ALEXIS DE TOC-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 281 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 15th ed. 1985) (1830)).
251. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 885–86. R
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participate in culturally sensitive decisions about the meaning of
video, and thus about the law.252
Jury treatment of video evidence remains problematic, particu-
larly jury tendency to treat video as objective, conclusive and overly
persuasive, and to over-emphasize video to the exclusion of other pro-
bative evidence.253  But culturally and demographically individualized
interpretation of video evidence might be procedurally acceptable
from jurors, whose specific charge is to bring their lay personal per-
spectives (culturally determined, of course) to resolve factual disputes
on behalf of the community.  Which is not to say that a verdict that
was based on an understanding of video evidence dramatically differ-
ent from that of some significant (culturally defined) portion of the
public would not be controversial.  That verdict would be met with
greater outrage because more people will have seen and formed their
own (culturally bound) conclusions about what it shows; this explains
much of the violence after the first Rodney King verdict.  But that
perhaps can be overcome through (hopefully) culturally representa-
tive juries.  Summary judgment on brute-sense video impression, as in
Scott and other cases, remains uniquely problematic in labeling com-
peting views as unreasonable.
IV. VIDEO EVIDENCE AND NON-LITIGATION REMEDIATION
Video evidence also affects strategic responses of government de-
fendants and policymakers to an arguably unconstitutional police-
public encounter.  Government might respond to video in two ways,
beyond using it to defend against constitutional claims in litigation.
First, policymakers may remedy deficiencies revealed by the violations
at issue, especially by punishing the officers involved through firing,
suspending, reassigning, or otherwise disciplining, and by altering de-
partmental rules, policies, and operations to deter and prevent future
violations.  For example, within days of the videotaped beating in May
2008, the Philadelphia Police Department removed thirteen officers
from street duty pending further investigation and review of the video
by the department and prosecutors.254  Within one month, eight of-
ficers had been fired or otherwise disciplined.255  The verbally abusive
police officer caught on tape threatening Brett Darrow was fired
within a few weeks.256  The officer who tackled the bicyclist in the Crit-
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 107–119 and accompanying text. R
254. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. R
255. Hurdle, supra note 16. R
256. See Woodward, supra note 13. R
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ical Mass incident was placed on modified assignment—a routine
non-disciplinary action to freeze matters pending investigation—al-
though we might infer that the NYPD acted, at least in part, because
of the attention that the video garnered and the expected brute-sense
public impression that it revealed misconduct.257
Administrative and policy changes can be made on a grander
scale.  Following the May 2007 immigration rally-gone-awry, the LAPD
undertook a six-month study, including the review of many video
sources.  The department reassigned or fired all eight of the supervi-
sory officers on the scene.  It also recommended a host of policies
changes, including how the department uses video to document pub-
lic rallies, how the department deals with the media covering and re-
cording public protest rallies, and how officers decide on targeted
arrests as opposed to mass arrests and crowd-dispersal as a means to
control public gatherings.258
Second, government may settle litigation.  In fact, if Kahan, Hoff-
man, and Braman’s goal is increased judicial hesitancy to grant sum-
mary judgment on brute-sense understandings of video, the
consequence may be increased settlement because settlement fre-
quently is a defendant’s immediate move after summary judgment is
denied.259  Indeed, in response to the incidents in Seattle and Miami,
Seattle settled claims against it for more than $1 million and Miami
settled claims against it for more than $500,000.260
It seems logical, although not empirically provable, that settle-
ment and other remediation are more likely in video cases.  Public
attention and outrage produces government action; attention and
outrage are more likely when video has gone “viral” and is being de-
voured and dissected on YouTube, blogs, and the mainstream news
media, and where visceral public reaction to the video reflects a wide
popular interpretation of the video as showing governmental miscon-
duct.  A viral video puts government on its heels, forcing it to publicly
defend its officers (at least initially), while also recognizing that, be-
cause of the video, the people have developed informed perceptions
and conclusions about the incident—perceptions that officials must
respect (or at least consider) in making administrative decisions.261
257. See Chan, supra note 24; supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. R
258. See LAPD REPORT, supra note 23, at 70–80, 85. R
259. See Bronsteen, supra note 123, at 529 & n.39; Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note R
174, at 94. R
260. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. R
261. Addressing the controversy over the police officer who tackled the bicycle rider,
Mayor Michael Bloomberg emphasized the police department’s need for time to investi-
gate and gather all the facts, while also acknowledging that the officer’s actions, as shown
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This is especially true when deciding whether to settle.  These non-
litigation effects reflect the import of Zick’s argument about expres-
sive groups using new technologies to record and disseminate images
of their protests and public confrontations with police as part of one
overall message.  They can call attention to government efforts to
limit the group’s expression; in doing so, they both strengthen their
litigation positions on any constitutional claims and force changes in
government behavior and policy that might allow for freer expression
in the future.262
Government officials and government lawyers watch a video with
a different eye when analyzing whether to settle or take remedial pol-
icy steps.  They are not deciding whether a case is worthy of a fact-
finder, which should require a more open-minded and non-determi-
native examination of the video.263  Rather, they act as fact-finders of
sorts, interpreting the video and deciding what it means and what
story it tells, and the story they draw guides their litigation and policy
strategies.  They analyze the video as a jury would: drawing inferences
and reaching factual conclusions as to what the video actually means
and what the official response should be to that message.
At the same time, government must recognize and account for
the brute-sense impressions that members of the public and of a po-
tential jury might develop upon viewing the same video.  The Kahan-
Hoffman-Braman analysis has much to offer here.  Policymakers must
recognize and account for the possibility of public dissensus as to the
video’s narrative.  In other words, regardless of how policymakers
themselves interpret and understand the video, they must consider
whether the public or some subcommunity (united by demographics,
ideology, political concerns, or some combination) will see unconsti-
tutional behavior.  At the policy level, officials must decide whether
that subcommunity is sufficiently large and/or politically influential to
force policy or personnel changes that officials might not otherwise be
inclined to make were they acting solely on their own interpretation
in the video, “certainly looked like—inappropriate is a nice way to phrase it.”  Colin Moyni-
han, The Officer, the Bicyclist and the Video, N.Y. Times, July 29, 2008, available at http://
cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/the-officer-the-bicyclist-and-the-video/?scp=3&
sq=Critical%20Mass&st=cse; see supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text; see also Walters, R
supra note 15 (describing calls by the Philadelphia police commissioner for public patience R
and further department review, while acknowledging that the video suggested that force
seemed excessive); supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. R
262. ZICK, supra note 3, at 220, 256–57; see also Moynihan, supra note 261 (describing R
group’s efforts to routinely collect video accounts of confrontations with police and to
obtain video from unknown tourist who captured the officer showing a bicyclist on tape);
supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. R
263. See supra notes 166–179, 214–252 and accompanying text. R
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of the video.  At the litigation level, lawyers must anticipate the com-
position of the jury and how, given that composition, it likely would
interpret the video’s message.  Lawyers also might take account of the
understanding of the public at large (or some culturally linked subset
of the public) in making settlement choices.  If a vocal portion of the
public sees unconstitutional conduct in its viewing of the video, those
people might wonder why the government continues to defend the
case and the misbehaving officers at public cost, rather than settling
the case and moving forward.
Policymakers might engage the difficult task of explaining to the
public that video is incomplete and open to interpretation, explaining
how they interpret or understand a video and how and why the story
they see in the images departs from the common public story.  But if
the recording looks so viscerally unfavorable to the police, as with the
Critical Mass, Philadelphia, or Brett Darrow recordings, this may be
practically and politically impossible.
Government officials should make litigation, policy, and person-
nel choices with the same caution against over-emphasizing video as
should judges and jurors in making adjudicative decisions.264  At bot-
tom, everyone is involved in a similar underlying inquiry—determin-
ing what happened in the real-world police-public encounter and
what the video suggests happened.  Accepting that video does not al-
ways or necessarily provide unambiguous, unbiased, objective, trans-
parent, and singular certainty,265 hesitancy and prudence should be
the rule for every legal and political actor who must make decisions
based on that recording.  Determining whether to settle or whether to
discipline an officer or whether to change departmental approaches
to political rallies should no more be based on false assumptions
about video’s unquestioned and unambiguous “truth” than should a
summary judgment determination.
Sometimes this produces a split response.  In the Utah taser case,
the state declined to punish the officer, obviously because its review of
the video indicated that no constitutional wrongdoing had oc-
curred.266  But it also settled the driver’s Section 1983 action, perhaps
264. See supra Part III.E.
265. See supra notes 40–43, 107–112 and accompanying text. R
266. Nizza, supra note 14.  For an argument that the video is at least ambiguous as to R
whether the officer acted unconstitutionally, see Posting of Orin Kerr on The Volokh Con-
spiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_12_09-2007_12_15.shtml#1197327587
(Dec. 10, 2007, 21:40 EST).
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anticipating how a jury likely would view that video at trial and taking
the path of least expense.267
V. RESTRICTING THE CREATION OF VIDEO
Our analysis thus shifts to the front end to examine when and
how video and audio recordings of public encounters can be made
and for what purposes, including litigation, public dissemination, or
governmental change.  The real effect of video and audio evidence on
civil rights enforcement and vindication depends on the antecedent
question of the availability of video, which in turn depends on the
number and range of video sources.
Ric Simmons’s basic point—Orwell’s vision was wrong because
modern technology enables the public to watch government and
check official misconduct268—is accurate only if there are constitu-
tional and policy protections for members of the public using technol-
ogy to record public events to which they are parties or witnesses.
Perhaps video is not, and should not be treated as, the overwhelming,
objective, unambiguous, singular, and conclusive proof that courts
and the public believe it to be.  But the descriptive reality is that
courts,269 government officials,270 and the public271 all treat it as if it
is.  And even if it is not perfect evidence, it remains probative evidence
that is beneficial to the truth-finding process.272  We maintain the bal-
ance of power over availability of video and audio recording of public
encounters only by recognizing a liberty to record—that is, recogniz-
ing that Big Brother cannot interfere with the public’s ability to watch
him.
Government might stop people from recording public en-
counters in two ways.  One is through enactment and enforcement of
express prohibitions on secret or unconsented-to recording of per-
sons and conversations.273  The other is through officers’ efforts to
move filmers away from the scene, to confiscate equipment, and, per-
267. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. R
268. Simmons, supra note 1, at 532. R
269. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1775–76 (2007); Marvin v. City of Taylor,
509 F.3d 234, 239, 241 (6th Cir. 2007); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1262 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2007).
270. See supra Part IV.
271. See, e.g., Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note 3, at 24–25; supra notes 28–30 and ac- R
companying text.
272. See supra notes 113–115 and accompanying text. R
273. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Mass. 2001); see also infra Part
V.A.
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haps, to arrest filmers for violating non-speech laws of general
applicability.274
Official efforts to halt public recording of police-public en-
counters become the basis for independent, “secondary” constitu-
tional challenges to limits on recording.  The success of such
secondary challenges ultimately determines the real effect that video
evidence will have in civil rights enforcement, in resolving (with or
without litigation) primary constitutional challenges to the underlying
public police misconduct captured on audio or video.275  The more
robust constitutional liberty of the people and the press to record po-
lice-public encounters, the greater the effect that video evidence has
on primary civil rights enforcement against police misconduct, and
the more we can say that the People truly are able to watch the gov-
ernment in a meaningful way.  This determines whether Simmons’s
optimism about technology—that it enables the public to watch gov-
ernment as much as the other way around—is warranted.
A. Privacy Protections and Wiretap Laws
Government might broadly prohibit all surreptitious or uncon-
sented-to recording, extending that prohibition to conversations in-
volving police officers performing their official functions.  In
Commonwealth v. Hyde,276 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court af-
firmed a state-law wiretapping conviction against a motorist who
secretly used a hand-held recorder during a traffic stop that went
“sour.”277  Massachusetts law prohibits “secretly hear[ing], secretly re-
cord[ing] . . . any wire or oral communication . . . by any person other
than a person given prior authority by all parties.”278  The court read
that absolute prohibition as an expression of the legislature’s unam-
biguous intent “to prohibit the secret recording of the speech of any-
one,” including police officers performing their official duties in
public.279  Eugene Volokh suggests that Hyde provides the legal basis
for other instances in which individuals in Massachusetts could be
274. See Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538–40 (E.D. Pa. 2005); see also
infra Part V.B.
275. In Robinson, the plaintiff was videotaping the truck searches because he believed
police were conducting them in an unsafe manner and he wanted to bring the misconduct
to the attention of his state representative. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 538–39, 541. The
arrest at issue in the § 1983 action was the second time that police had attempted to stop
Robinson from recording these searches for this purpose. Id. at 539.
276. 750 N.E.2d 963.
277. Id. at 965, 971.
278. Id. at 966; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (West 2000).
279. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966.
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prosecuted for recording public confrontations with members of law
enforcement.280
It is inconsistent with democracy and democratic political ac-
countability for government officials to have protectable privacy inter-
ests when performing official functions, especially in the context of
adversarial encounters with members of the public.  Privacy rights
should not extend so far as to enable officers to hide their unlawful
conduct and insulate it from challenge.  In fact, the government only
learned that Hyde had recorded the encounter because he presented
the tape to the police department as corroborating evidence in sup-
port of his formal department complaint about the officers’ conduct
during the recorded encounter.281  In other words, Hyde got in
trouble when he initiated a primary constitutional challenge to the
underlying police misconduct and tried to use video evidence to sup-
port that claim.
Massachusetts law is unique, a point the Hyde majority empha-
sized; similar anti-wiretap provisions in other states require that the
recorded conversation be private or that the participants have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy, which typically excludes conversations
that are part of official law enforcement conduct.282  Thus, there were
very different results in the Crespo case in New York or the Darrow
case in Missouri, where the surreptitious or unconsented-to audio re-
cording did not result in charges against the citizen-recorder and
could be used as a basis for punishing the recorded police
misconduct.283
The privacy protection recognized in Hyde prohibits not only re-
cordings by the person involved in the police encounter, but also re-
cordings by third-party members of the public who witness the
encounter.  The Hyde dissent thus argued that the majority’s rationale
would have rendered unlawful the video of the Rodney King beating,
the paradigm of surreptitious recording of police misconduct; that
video was made by a third-party civilian witness to events, similarly
without the officers’ knowledge or consent and in violation of their
privacy rights as defined by the Hyde majority.284  In response, the ma-
280. Posting of Eugene Volokh on The Volokh Conspiracy,   http://www.volokh.com/
posts/1201752162.shtml (Jan. 31, 2008, 00:05 EST).
281. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965.
282. Id. at 967 n.5 (citing eavesdropping or wiretapping laws from several states).
283. See supra notes 13–12 and accompanying text. R
284. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 971–72 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). It also would have made a
misdemeanor of the current-day version of the Rodney King video and the recording of
the assault on the rider at the 2008 Critical Mass rally. See supra note 24 and accompanying R
text.
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jority emphasized differences between Massachusetts and California
law, with the latter exempting recordings of events and conversations
in which there is no expectation of privacy.285  But that response
misses the larger policy point about the appropriate scope of privacy-
protecting legal rules and the unintended negative consequences of
broad privacy protection.286
According to the Hyde majority, arguments for protecting surrep-
titious citizen recording reflected a belief that “police officers rou-
tinely act illegally or abusively, to the degree that public policy
strongly requires documentation of details of contacts between the po-
lice and members of the public to protect important rights.”287  But,
as the dissent properly argued, it is “the recognition of the potential
for abuse of power that has caused our society, and law enforcement
leadership, to insist that citizens have the right to demand the most of
those who hold such awesome powers.”288
Clearly, the basic act of recording officers in the performance of
their official duties does not burden the officers or interfere with their
ability to execute their offices.  After all, police make their own re-
cordings of many of these encounters, without concern that the re-
cording will interfere with the officer’s job.289  A surreptitious
recording, by the person involved or by a bystander, does not become
such an intrusion simply because the police did not know about or
control the video.
Indeed, advocates for police recording argue that video reveals
the “truth” of events by providing additional, purportedly objective,
evidence; it exposes police misconduct or lies about police miscon-
duct, deters it by increasing the likelihood of being caught, and pro-
tects officers from false claims of excessive force by providing
definitive evidence.290  Those policy goals are furthered by all video
from all sources; any video, regardless of its source, functions as evi-
dence of the police-public encounter and helps to tell a complete
story.  Consider that the NYPD officer who tackled the Critical Mass
rider stated in an affidavit that the defendant had ridden his bicycle
into him, a statement “blatantly contradicted” by the video that seems
285. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 970–71 (majority opinion).
286. See Volokh, supra note 280 (arguing that privacy-protecting rules are not uniformly R
positive and may have undesirable consequences).
287. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 969.
288. Id. at 977 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
289. See id. at 969 n.9 (majority opinion) (citing Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d
1326, 1328–29 (Mass. 1996)) (recognizing police controlled recording as a “good
practice”).
290. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. R
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to show the officer edging towards the curb to hit the defendant.291
One explanation for this contradiction might be that the officer was
unaware that his actions had been recorded and thus unaware that
some evidence (other than the word of the individual involved in the
confrontation) might challenge his statements.  Expanding the possi-
bility and availability of video is essential to challenging such false
statements and exposing unconstitutional conduct.
We also gain deterrence because police know that members of
the public—either the individuals involved or bystander-witnesses to
the event—might be carrying recording devices.  In fact, real deter-
rence comes from the officers never knowing who or when someone
may be recording the encounter.292
If the goal is for everyone to be able to watch everyone, govern-
ment cannot maintain monopoly control over the ability to record
public confrontations.  More video from more sources must be the
norm and individuals must remain unconstrained in their ability to
capture, in powerful sensory form, details of official law enforcement
conduct that might be the subject of civil or criminal litigation.
B. First Amendment and Restrictions on Video Recording
Beyond policy-level appropriateness of wiretap laws is whether the
Constitution affords the press and public a front-end liberty to record
police-public encounters in public spaces.  Stated differently, the
question is whether and how government officials could attempt to
prohibit members of the public from recording police-public
activities.
Courts are split as to whether, and to what extent, the First
Amendment accords liberty to gather information on public events.293
Several lower courts have recognized a right to photograph and re-
cord events in public spaces, so long as recorders do not interfere with
police efforts, as by getting too close to the events or otherwise dis-
rupting government functions.294  Pursuant to a consent decree, the
291. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. R
292. Interestingly, the officer who confronted Brett Darrow saw the video camera in
Darrow’s car and even asked him why he had the camera. Darrow explained that he in-
stalled it because of prior confrontations with police.  The officer proceeded to verbally
abuse and threaten Darrow anyway, even while aware that the camera was running. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
293. McDonald, supra note 70, at 251–53. R
294. See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that
plaintiffs had “a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner and place
restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55
F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that plaintiff had a “First Amendment right to film
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LAPD expressly agreed to take steps to protect the media’s vital First
Amendment role in reporting on public protest events and law en-
forcement conduct at those events, and to not unduly interfere with
press coverage.295  If the press and public enjoy liberty to record gov-
ernment interactions with others, there is no reason not to accord the
same protection when an individual records her own public encoun-
ter with police.
Consider Robinson v. Fetterman.296  The plaintiff was videotaping
state police officers conducting searches of trucks along a public high-
way, while standing twenty to thirty feet away, on private property, with
the owner’s permission.297  Officers ordered Robinson to stop filming,
confiscated his camera, arrested him, and cited him for harassment,
charges that eventually were dismissed.298  In a bench trial in his sub-
sequent Section 1983 action claiming First and Fourth Amendment
violations, the district court found that Robinson’s videotaping was
protected First Amendment activity, both as a “legitimate means of
gathering information for public dissemination” and as a source of
“cogent evidence,” in this case as part of Robinson’s efforts to show
that police were conducting the truck searches in an inappropriate
manner.299  The court concluded that no reasonable officer could
have believed that Robinson’s unobtrusive videotaping was unlawful,
making his arrest a First Amendment violation and, in turn, making
the arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.300  The court awarded the plaintiff more than $40,000 in com-
pensatory and punitive damages.301
The outcome in Robinson contrasts with one effect of the broad
anti-wiretap law in Hyde and reveals constitutional concerns with that
broad prohibition.  A law as broad as Massachusetts’s means that any
party to an event is free to withhold or withdraw consent to recording.
matters of public interest”); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (recognizing that plaintiff who was standing twenty to thirty feet away from state
troopers conducting truck inspections had a First Amendment right to videotape); Connell
v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 468–69 (D.N.H. 1990) (stating that news gathering is
protected by the First Amendment “so long as [it] do[es] not unreasonably obstruct or
interfere with [police efforts]”).
295. LAPD REPORT, supra note 23, at 48–49. One of the Report’s key findings was that R
officers on the scene of the May Day protest had not done enough to protect the press
during the rally.
296. 378 F. Supp. 2d 534.
297. Id. at 539; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text. R
298. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 539–40.
299. Id. at 541.
300. Id. at 541–43, 545.
301. Id. at 545–46.
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It thus empowers officers to order bystanders to stop recording or to
leave the scene; these stop orders effectively work a denial or with-
drawal of consent to record.  Police might prohibit members of the
public from documenting purported police misconduct for no other
reason than to protect officers’ own personal privacy interests.  There-
fore, had the truck searches in Robinson occurred in Massachusetts,
the wiretap law would have provided a lawful basis for the officers to
stop Robinson from recording, to confiscate his camera, and to arrest
him, all robbing us of probative (even if not conclusive) evidence of
police misconduct.
C. Toward a First Amendment Right to Record
Robinson is the paradigm of a secondary constitutional challenge
to government restrictions on individual efforts to record police activi-
ties occurring in public.  The success of such secondary challenges
ultimately determines the real effect that video evidence will have in
primary constitutional challenges to alleged police misconduct cap-
tured on audio or video, whether the recording is used in litigation or
in policy decisions.302  The greater the constitutional liberty of the
people and the press to record police-public encounters, the greater
the effect that video evidence has on primary civil rights enforcement
against police misconduct, and the more we can say that the people
truly are able to watch the government in a significant way.
These connections suggest the need for a fully developed First
Amendment liberty to record public events, a need that increases with
the continued development of smaller, easily used recording equip-
ment and the technological ability of large numbers of people to
gather and disseminate audio and video.303  The need also increases
as the evidentiary importance of, and judicial demand for, conclusive
video evidence increases.304
Unfortunately, the source of this liberty to record has not been
fully theorized.  Most courts base it on some form of free speech lib-
302. Robinson was videotaping the truck searches, as a form of petition activity, because
he believed police were conducting them in an unsafe manner and he wanted to bring the
misconduct to the attention of his state representative. Id. at 538–39, 541.  The arrest at
issue in the § 1983 action was the second time that police had attempted to stop Robinson
from recording these searches for this purpose. Id. at 539; see supra note 52 and accompa- R
nying text.
303. ZICK, supra note 3, at 294; McDonald, supra note 70, at 262–63; supra notes 85–98 R
and accompanying text.
304. See Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 248–49 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that
police did not violate arrestee’s constitutional rights because video did not clearly depict
excessive force as plaintiff described).
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erty to gather information on matters of public interest occurring in
public305 or on the right of access to public spaces and meetings.306
At a visceral level, “[t]aking photographs at a public event is a facially
innocent act” that should not form the basis for arrest or liability.307
And that might be doctrinally sufficient in the main run of public
protest cases in which a rally participant records police halting public
expression through dispersals and mass arrests.
As Barry McDonald has argued, however, this fragmented and in-
complete understanding of the basis for the right to gather informa-
tion, particularly in public, may “denigrate core First Amendment
values” and “threaten to eliminate any sort of meaningful protection
for the gathering of important information about other public af-
fairs.”308  McDonald rejects the unthinking link to the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech Clause because the conduct at issue—using
cameras, audio and video recorders, and computers to gather infor-
mation for dissemination—cannot, in itself, be characterized as “ex-
pressive activity.”309
An additional problem with this lack of firm constitutional
grounding is the potentially distinct nature of distinct rights depend-
ing on the context of the particular police-public encounter.  The
right may be different when asserted by a member of the institutional
press as opposed to an ordinary member of the public; there may be
analytical differences between a bystander filming someone else’s con-
frontation with police and a person recording her own confrontation.
The purpose of the recording also might matter.  It thus is worth con-
sidering two potential sources of a First Amendment liberty to video
and audio record police-public encounters.
305. See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The First
Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on
public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v.
City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing protester’s “First Amendment
right to film matters of public interest”); Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (recognizing
plaintiff’s videotaping of state troopers as a “legitimate means of gathering information for
public dissemination”).
306. See Whiteland Woods L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 183–84 (3d
Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff’s First Amendment right of access to public meeting was
not violated by prohibition on videotaping where plaintiff was able “to compile a full re-
cord of the proceedings . . . [by] audiotaping”).
307. See Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158 (11th Cir. 1995).
308. McDonald, supra note 70, at 355. R
309. Id. at 270.
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1. Free Press Clause
McDonald grounds a general right in the Free Press Clause,
which he argues operates as an independent source of liberty for all
individuals and organizations (not only the institutional press) to
gather information of public value for purposes of public dissemina-
tion.310  The Speech Clause protects dissemination of recorded infor-
mation of its own force; the Press Clause does independent work by
protecting the often-structured process of antecedent information-
gathering conduct.311  This proposed right has two elements. First, the
information recorded must be the type of content that “could reason-
ably be said to foster or promote societal interests” in “informed dem-
ocratic self-governance,” including information about the operations
and affairs of government312 and official and public conduct of law
enforcement.313  Second, the events or information recorded must be
“sought for the purpose of disseminating it to the public, and not just for
individual consumption or dissemination to a limited audience se-
lected for personal reasons.”314
McDonald’s standard plainly protects news media filming public
political rallies, such as the protests in Miami or Los Angeles.315  That
standard also is consistent with acknowledged law enforcement obliga-
tions to guarantee media access and opportunity to record public
events as they occur.316  It also guarantees the ability of others on the
scene to observe, record, and bear witness to events, even if not for-
mally part of the institutional press.317  And it should protect the
plaintiff in Robinson, who recorded the truck searches to create a re-
cord of what he considered inappropriate police conduct, intending
to present the recorded evidence to the state legislature.318  This right
prohibits police from halting or dissuading recording or from enforc-
ing broad anti-wiretap laws, such as the one in Massachusetts.
It is less clear that McDonald’s right extends to members of a
protest group recording their own encounters with police.  Protesters
often are less concerned with information dissemination and their
310. Id. at 354.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 345.
313. Id. at 341–42.
314. Id. at 348.
315. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. R
316. LAPD REPORT, supra note 23, at 48–49. R
317. Cf. Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 466 (D.N.H. 1990) (entailing
claim by free-lance photographer attempting to record police handling of traffic accident).
318. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005); see supra notes 52, R
302 and accompanying text. R
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purpose may not be primarily to inform the public.  This again recalls
Zick’s argument that recording and disseminating information about
government efforts to halt or restrict public expression should be-
come part of a group’s expression.319  McDonald’s model protects the
recording itself, at least where some dissemination follows.  Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit in Fordyce accepted, albeit without discussion or con-
tours, the idea that a member of a protest group who also was record-
ing the march for dissemination on cable-access television was entitled
to First Amendment protection in his videotaping.320
But this position is less certain than with media and third-party
recorders.  And McDonald’s conceived right certainly will not protect
the individual driver or arrestee with an MP3 player in his pocket or a
video camera mounted in his car, whose purpose in recording the
encounter (i.e., in gathering information) is for use in whatever crimi-
nal or civil rights litigation arises from this confrontation and who
likely is not thinking (at least primarily) about public dissemination.
Of course, we might argue that civil litigation, especially constitu-
tional claims against government and government officials, is a means
of disseminating information about official misconduct—perhaps
even a more important and more effective way of doing so.321  Civil
litigation is an open and public process, particularly at the trial
stage.322  Video and audio recordings that are part of the evidentiary
record thus are disseminated to the public for consideration, viewing,
and reaction.  Civil rights litigation is inherently expressive.323  Mc-
Donald’s proposed standard thus could accord constitutional protec-
tion to all public recording of police conduct, even where the initial
intended use of the video is for evidence in litigation.
319. ZICK, supra note 3, at 257; supra notes 97–98. R
320. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438, 442 (9th Cir. 1995).
321. See Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 685 (1999) (“Civil rights actions against
the government present issues, at least as important, if not more so, than general speech
about public officials.”).
322. See Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 357, 361–62 (2006) (arguing that litigation is a public process, requiring public access
to “the information that drives adjudication”); see also Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality
in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 50–53 (1984) (arguing for a narrow rule
of public access to pre-trial discovery in certain cases where there is a substantial public
interest, usually involving government misconduct).
323. See Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty—U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International
Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 644 (2002) (“In articulating a sense of justice, both in the
specific context of the lawsuit and in a broad normative sense of what the lawsuit teaches,
litigation speaks to society as a whole.”).
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2. Petition Clause
A different liberty to record could be grounded in the First
Amendment’s Petition Clause.324  The Hyde court rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that Hyde had freely exercised his right to petition
for redress by bringing his complaint of police misconduct to the de-
partment, which investigated the incident, including a review of the
audiotape of the encounter.325  But it was the very petition (or the
evidence presented in support of that petition) that led to his prose-
cution.326  The court unfortunately did not acknowledge the need to
document the police encounter antecedent to petitioning, blithely as-
serting that Hyde “was not prosecuted for making the recording; he
was prosecuted for doing so secretly.”327  Of course, this response ig-
nores that Massachusetts law is not about secrecy; it is about privacy
and consent.  State law would have empowered officers to halt even
open recording; officers could have ordered Hyde to turn the re-
corder off, thereby denying their consent to be recorded in the name
of their unadorned privacy rights against unwanted recording.328
The Petition Clause, properly conceptualized, might get us where
McDonald’s Press Clause model does not: defining a complete liberty
of information gathering that covers all recording of law enforcement
encounters.  Civil litigation against government and government offi-
cials is recognized as protected petition activity, a form of calling on
government to answer to, and provide redress for, grievances.329  This
includes judicial determinations that government officials have acted
unlawfully.330
Carol Rice Andrews proposes a narrow petition liberty to file win-
ning claims in court, a right which would subject all direct restrictions
324. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of
the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”); see Andrews, supra
note 321, at 557–59 (recognizing Petition Clause as a basis for an individual’s right of R
access to the courts); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a
First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899,
899 (1997) (arguing that the Petition Clause should be interpreted as a “guaranteed right
to pursue judicial remedies for unlawful government conduct”).
325. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Mass. 2001).
326. Id. at 965.
327. Id. at 969.
328. See supra notes 280–289 and accompanying text. R
329. Andrews, supra note 321, at 685; see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 R
(1985) (“[F]iling a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity.”); Cal. Motor
Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (“The right of access to the courts
is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”); Andrews, supra note 321, at 587 (“[T]he R
Petition Clause independently protects access to court.”).
330. Pfander, supra note 324, at 983. R
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on court access to strict scrutiny.331  Further, this core liberty to file
winning suits requires “breathing room” to avoid a chilling effect, in
the form of broader protections, for related non-core activity.332
Breathing room demands some limited protection for the filing of
losing suits as a buffer to the core right.333
The question is whether this liberty, so conceived, protects mem-
bers of the public in recording public encounters between police and
citizens (themselves or others) for the primary or exclusive purpose of
creating evidence to prove or disprove a subsequent constitutional
claim against government and government officials.  Evidence gather-
ing is not at the core of the right Andrews proposes, since it is not tied
to filing and pursuing winning claims.  But evidence gathering is an
incident to filing a winning claim, thus protecting it gives that core
liberty breathing space.  Recording encounters and using the record-
ing as evidence strengthens the plaintiff’s ability to prove his claim—
making it more likely the type of “winning case” that he has the right
to file.
Even if video is not, and should not be treated as, the overwhelm-
ing, objective, unambiguous, singular, and conclusive proof that
courts and the public believe it to be, the descriptive reality, for the
moment, is that courts, government officials, and the public all treat it
as if it is.  If video carries such evidentiary weight and significance, an
individual, seeking to exercise his First Amendment liberty to file win-
ning lawsuits, cannot be limited or prevented altogether from ob-
taining, in public spaces and in a non-interfering manner, persuasive
evidence to support (to make into winning) claims arising out of his
encounter with police.
Several considerations bolster this conclusion.  First, law enforce-
ment itself may be recording the encounter, so the plaintiff’s record-
ing simply provides additional probative evidence.334  Second, absent
any recording evidence, the he-said, she-said nature of the case typi-
cally works against plaintiffs and in favor of police.335  Video evidence,
balanced against testimony, moves the case away from the he-said, she-
said field.  Third, the burden of a case such as the Sixth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Marvin v. City of Taylor cannot be overlooked.  The Marvin
court went beyond looking at video for consistency with the plaintiff’s
version, but granted summary judgment against the plaintiff when the
331. Andrews, supra note 321, at 663–64, 676–77. R
332. Id. at 680–83.
333. Id. at 683.
334. See supra notes 5–9, 216 and accompanying text. R
335. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR303.txt unknown Seq: 61 21-APR-09 11:02
660 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:600
video did not affirmatively establish his claim.336  If that is the burden
of production that the plaintiff carries to get by summary judgment
with his “winning claim,” he only can satisfy that burden if he has a
strong front-end liberty to obtain that video evidence through his own
efforts.
The result of this conception of the Petition Clause is that any
restrictions on the ability of individuals to record public encounters—
whether a statute such as the Massachusetts wiretap law in Hyde or
police officers arresting someone for attempting to record an encoun-
ter in Robinson—must be subject to some First Amendment scrutiny,
in light of the potential effect the recording will have on subsequent
primary civil rights litigation over the recorded events and the possi-
bility that the video will enhance the plaintiff’s winning constitutional
claim.
The Supreme Court has held that the news gathering right does
not necessarily guarantee the most effective way to gather information
in government spaces and meetings.337  One might argue that the
right to file (and prove) winning claims is vindicated so long as a wit-
ness to the encounter is able to testify to events, without any addi-
tional right to bolster the evidentiary record with video or audio.  Two
things weigh against this argument.  First, Andrews’s point is not that
all right-of-court-access rules are unconstitutional, only that they must
satisfy some level of First Amendment scrutiny.338  This shifts the bur-
den of persuasion onto government to justify limitations on record-
ing, something it likely cannot do as to recording in public spaces.
Second, and related, government will be recording many of these
same public encounters.  Thus, a public right to record is necessary to
maintain the balance of evidentiary power—to ensure that the public
can watch Big Brother, just as Big Brother watches the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
Video is increasingly pervasive in society, as more and more peo-
ple gain the ability to record the people and events around them.
Video also is increasingly pervasive in law, as more and more of the
events recorded in public become the basis for civil and criminal liti-
gation and come to be used as evidence in that litigation.
336. Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 240, 248–49 (6th Cir. 2007); see supra notes
185–196 and accompanying text. R
337. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538, 550 (1965) (holding that court may place
restrictions on types of news gathering inside courthouse).
338. See Andrews, supra note 321, at 560–62. R
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Like much else in the law, video is neither an unadorned good
nor an unadorned bad; the reality is far more complex.  As evidence,
it has high probative value in advancing the search for truth, but not
so high that it should dominate a jury and its deliberations.  It is im-
portant evidence, but not an unassailable source of proof, not the ob-
jective, true, singular, unambiguous evidence it so often is thought to
be.  And it should not be an excuse for courts to disregard ordinary
procedure and rely on their own interpretations of video to take cases
away from juries on summary judgment.
The goal here has been a proper, and properly nuanced, under-
standing of the role of video at the front end and back end of civil
rights enforcement.  At the front end, we must recognize the contours
of a First Amendment liberty to video- and audio-record events occur-
ring in public, one that guarantees individuals the right to record
their own encounters with police and those encounters they witness.
At the back end, we must understand the appropriate use to which
video should be put as a source of proof in civil rights litigation arising
from those police-public encounters.
Only with a clear and accurate understanding of these twin roles
of video can we conclude that Ric Simmons was correct and Orwell
incorrect—that technology has enabled the people to watch, and hold
accountable, the government and not the other way around.
